Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

3-26-1958

People v. Osslo [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "People v. Osslo [DISSENT]" (1958). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 27.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/27

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

REPORTS OF CASES
DETERMINED IN

THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

[50 C.2d 75; 323 P.2d 397]

[Crim. No. 6127.

In Bank.

Mar. 26, 1958.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MAX OSSLO et al.,
Appellants.
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact.-An appellate court will not determine the weight of the evidence, but
will decide only whether on the face of the evidence it can be
held that sufficient facts could not have been found by the
jury to warrant the inference of guilt.
[2] Assault-Evidence.-A jury determination that all of the
members of a sailors' union hired by a butchers' union to act
as "observers" during its labor dispute with a clerks' union
participated in an assault and battery on two clerks was supported by evidence that the sailors, on being informed that
the clerks were in a certain market, surrounded them, stomped
on their feet, and, after one of the clerks got away, made an
unprovoked assault on the other clerk.
[3] Id.-Review.-Resolution of conflicting evidence as to whether
certain defendants participated in an assault is for the trier
of fact, not for a reviewing court.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 1309; [2, 6] Assault,
§ 8; [3, 8, 11] Assault, § 13; [4] Criminal Law, § 389(3); [5]
Conspiracy, § 23; [7] Assault, § 7; [9, 10] Conspiracy, § 19; [12]
Conspiracy,§ 5; [13, 17, 18, 26] Criminal Law,§ 1404; [14] Jury,
§ 103(1); [15) Criminal Law, § 1388; [16] Crimina: Law, § 1404
(5); [19, 20, 24] Criminal Law, § 1404(6); [21] Criminal Law,
§ 1407; [22, 23] Criminal Law,§ 1407(3); [25, 28] Criminal Law,
§ 1404(12); [27] Criminal Law,§ 1407(9); (29, 31] Criminal Law,
§ 990; [30) Criminal Law, § 991; [32] Judges, § 21; [33] Criminal
Law, §§ 237, 250.
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[ 4] Criminal Law- Evidence- Facts Showing Consciousness of
Guilt.-False statements of defendants, made through deliberate and willful intent, concerning matters within their own
knowledge and relating materially to the issue of their guilt
or innocence of the offenses of which they were convicted,
cogently evidenced consciousness of guilt, suggested that there
was no honest explanation for incriminating circumstances,
and thus were admissions of guilt.
[5] Conspiracy-Criminal-Evidence.-A conspiracy can generally
be established only by circumstantial evidence, since it is not
often that the direct fact of a common unlawful design can
be proved other than by establishment of independent facts
bearing on such design.
[6] Assault-Evidence.-From evidence that defendants, who were
representatives of a butchers' union involved in a labor dispute
with a clerks' union and who had been actively and extensively
engaged in union affairs, hired members of a sailors' union,
other members of which had participated in labor disputes to
which the sailors' union was not a party and had committed
an assault and battery in connection with one such dispute,
and from the size and build and appearance of those members
of the sailors' union who were employed, from the fact that
such sailors were not familiar with the locations of various
foods in the markets or with the terms of the butchers' contracts but wt>re assertedly employed to act as "observers" to
ascertain whetht>r clerks were handling packaged foods which
the butchers claimed should be handled by the latter and that
the sailors were paid at a higher rate of compensation than
members of the butchers' union, it was a reasonable inference
that defendants anticipated and agreed that the sailors would
initiate violence against the clerks.
[7] Id.-Evidence.-Evidence that members of a sailors' union,
hired by representatives of a butchers' union to act as "observers" of a clerks' union with which it was involved in a
labor dispute, participated in other labor disputes to which
the sailors' union was not a party and that other members of
the union were guilty of assault and battery in connection with
their participation in such disputes, was properly admitted
as tending to show that representatives of the butchers' union
contemplated that the employment of the sailors probably
would result in acts of violence by the sailors.
[8] Id.- Review- Harmless Error.- Evidence concerning fights
unconnected with union activities involving some members of
a sailors' union, hired by representatives of a butchers' union
to act as "observers" of a clerks' union with which it was
involved iu a labor dispute, was not admissible as tending
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, § 30; Am.Jur., Conspiracy, § 38.
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to show that those persons were hired with the expectation
that they would commit assaults connected with union activity, but error in admitting wch evidcnee did not mislead
the jury where there was ample evidence to show that such
persons participated in the assault and battery in f[Uestion.
Conspiracy-Criminal-Evidence.-Evidence in a conspiracy
case of many telephone calls between defendants and other
members of their organizations was properly received to show
defendants' association; that such association was criminal
was shown by other evidence, viewed as a whole.
Id.-Criminal-Evidence.-Testimony of a police officer concerning the arrest and release of certain members of a clerks'
union, after an assault on other clerks of which representatives
of a butchers' union and members of a sailors' union hired by
them were convicted, was admissible as tending to show that
an officer of the butchers' union, after tlw assault, attempted
to harass the clerks' union by unsubstantiated accusations and
to distract emphasis from the charg·es against him by countercharges, and as tending to show that sueh officer was a conspirator carrying on an effort to make good his declaration
that he "was boss of the \Vest Coast and he would fight for
jurisdiction."
[11] Assault-Review--Harmless Error.-A busirwss agent for a
butchers' union should have been permitted to testify on crossexamination by the defense that on a certain date a representative of the union reported to him and a certain officer of the
union that he had been frightened ut a market by members
of the clerks' union, with which the butcher~' u11ion was involved in a labor dispute, since sueh testimony was relevant
to the purpose of employment of members of a sailors' union
by representatives of the butchers' union as '"observers" of
activities of the clerks' union, but in the light of the entire
record the exclusion of such testimony did not prejudice the
members of the butchers' union or the sailors employed by
them.
[12] Conspiracy-Criminal-Particular Conspiraeies.-A conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor assault is a crime within the
purview of Pen. Code, § 182, subd. 1, providing for punishment for conspiracy to commit any crime.
[13] Criminal Law- Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of
Prosecuting Attorney.-Defendants were not prejudiced by a
press release of the prosecuting attorney published before trial
that they were attempting to delay trial, though they were
merely objecting, as they had a right to do, to the procedure
of having a jury selected by one judge and the actual trial
conducted by another judge, where the trial judge, in accord
with the request of defendants' counsel, specifically admon-
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ished the jurors to pay no attention to the newspaper statement and generally admonished them to pay no attention to
new spa per articles.
[14] Jury-Voir Dire Examination-Scope of Inquiry.-It was not
improper for the prosecuting attorney in an assault and conspiracy ease involving members of labor unions to ask prosp!~ctive jurors sueh questions as "You don't believe that might
makes right j?" "And do you feel that a person, because he is
a member of a labor union, deserves to get beat up once in
a while'/" and ''You wouldn't permit sympathy or the feeling
to 'let's give him another chance' to influence your decision in
this matter 7"; such questions were designed to elicit relevant
information concerning prospective jurors' states of mind.
[15] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Jury.-A question
asked prospective jurors in an assault and conspiracy case
involving members of labor unions, "You know a clerk was
beaten?" was not improper and could not be prejudicial, where
the fact was indubitably established and it concerned the
subject of the assault charge.
[16] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-Defendants in an assault and conspiracy case were
not prejudiced by the prosecuting attorney's opening statement
that one defendant was a member of the grand jury that returned the indictment, where defense counsel, in moving to
strike the statement, said "everybody knows that."
[17] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-Defcndants in an assault and conspiracy case involving one defendant who had been secretary-treasurer of a
butchers' union were not prejudiced by the prosecuting attorney's statement concerning the secretary-treasurer of another
butchers' union being "worried about [defendant J and worried
about goons," where evidence concerning this matter was subsequently excluded; this and other references to "goons" by
the prosecuting attorney were no more improper, in the light
of the evidence developed by the prosecution, than would be
a reference to "thieves" in a larceny prosecution.
[18] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-\Vhere the trial judge in an assault and conspiracy
case in the course of his preliminary instruction commenced
to read an instruction concerning assault with a deadly weapon whieh the prosecuting attorney had incorrectly included in
his requested instructions, then stopped reading and asked
the prosecuting attorney if it was his contention that a deadly
weapon was used, to which the attorney answered, "No. By
means of force," but then said, "A prize fighter is a weapon~"
this remark or query was improper, as was the request for an
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instruction concerning assault with a deadly weapon, but th('
incidents, not persisted in before the jury, were not prejudicial.
[19] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-Defendants in an assault and conspiracy case were
not prejudiced by the prosecution's act in bringing into the
courtroom a board on which were pictures referred to by
counsel as "rogue's gallery" photographs of defendants, assuming that the jury saw the photographs which the court declined
to permit in evidence, where the jury were clearly and repeatedly instructed that they must determine the facts from
the evidence produced in court and must not consider any
offer of evidence that was rejected by the court.
[20] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-Defendants in an assault and conspiraey case involving labor unions were not prejudiced by questions of the
prosecution to which objection was made and sustained,
whether a named labor leader supplied "strong ann men" for
use in labor disputes where, in a pretrial statement of one
defendant in connection with his motion to quash the indictment, it was admitted that defendant "turned to [the labor
leader] for help" and that such procedure in hlbor circles was
not considered unusual.
[21] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-\Vhere a witness in an assault and conspiracy case
testified that a person whom she had seen at the time of the
assault "is the second gentleman," indicating a certain defendant, whereupon the prosecuting attorney said, "I object to the
use of the word 'gentleman,'" the judge's prompt action in
rebuking the prosecuting attorney and admonishing the jury
to disregard his remark was sufficient to cure any harm that
might have resulted.
(22] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-\Vhere a poliee officer in an assault and conspiracy
case involving labor unions testified that he saw two members
of a sailor's union in the office of an oftieer of a butchers'
union and that "I didn't like a couple of big, husky men
walking around as bodyguards and gave the appearance of
being toughs of the worst sort," whereupon the prosecuting
attorney asked, "As a matter of fact, if you hadn't seen
them in [that] office you would have run them out of town,"
this improper question was not prejudicial, in view of the
judge's rebuke of the prosecuting attorney, and of the facts
that the jurors had ample opportunity to determine from persona.! observation whether the sailors WPre "hig, husky men,"
and were admonished thnt th1~y must dP<·ide the isf;nes on the
evidenc(' bPfore th(•Jll, not on remarko of: counsel.
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[23] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-·where the prosecuting attorney in an assault and
conspiracy case involving members of labor unions asked one
defendant, who was testifying, "As a matter of fact, any time
[a named labor leader J gets in any type of dispute that he is
out for a jurisdictional grab it is the old Communist slogan
he uses . . . ," whereupon defense counsel interrupted with an
objection and the trial judge sustained the objection and directed the jury to "disregard it," the interrupted, improper
question was not prejudicial.
[24] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-\Vhere defense counsel twice objected to the prosecuting attorney's "yelling" at one defendant while such defendant was being cross-examined, and on each occasion the
trial judge replied that the prosecuting attorney could use any
tone of voice he wished, such ruling could not be determined
to be either erroneous or prejudicial in the absence of a showing that the asserted "yelling" intimidated the witness or
harmed defendants.
[25] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-\Vhere the prosecuting attorney in closing argument in an assault case involving members of labor unions
referred to a case in which "a man died in the gas chamber"
because of a battery, assertedly similar to that involved in the
instant case, and ·where the judge promptly admonished the
prosecuting attorney to "confine yourself to this case," defendants were not harmed.
[26] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-In an assault and conspiracy case involving members of certain labor unions, the prosecuting attorney's reference to a noted labor leader and to a business agent of defendant butchers' union as "unindicted co-conspirators,"
though unfair to them in the sense that they were not before
the court and thus not in a position to answer the charge, was
not prejudicial to defendants where the reference suggested
the tenable view of the evidence taken by the prosecuting
attorney and presumptively taken by the jury.
[27] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-ln an assault and conspiracy case involving members of certain labor unions, any prejudicial effect of the
prosecuting attorney's statement in argument that a designated defendant was "the finger man," concerning which there
was no evidence, was corrected by the trial judge's prompt
admonition that ''The jury will remember the evidence . . . .
[I Jf the evidence isn't there the inference isn't there and they
will disregard it."
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!d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-In an assault and conspiracy case involving members of certain labor unions, the prosecuting attorney's statements in argument that a named labor leader was a "bed
fellow" of another named labor leader and that "It is two per
cent his [the first named labor leader's] fight against Communism and ninety eight per cent his
for jurisdictional
power," were not prejudicial where the statements were made
in reply to defense counsel's argument that the sailors' union,
to which some of the defendants belonged, "was the only thing
that stood between complete Communist control of the :Maritime industry and [the labor leader first named] personally
was responsible for that on every occasion."
[29] Id.-Probation-Conditions.-In an assault and conspiracy
case involving members of certain labor unions, the conditions
of probation granted those defendants who were members of
a butchers' union did not exceed the trial judge's power by
reason of the provision that such defendants should not, during
a 10-year probationary period, hold any union position or
receive remuneration from any union, where it could he and
presumptively was found that those defendants were guilty of
crimes growing out of union activities.
[30] !d.-Probation-Discretion of Court.-'rhe grant of probation
is entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court; a
defendant has no right to probation, bnt he has the right, if
he feels that the terms of probation are more harsh than the
sentence imposed by law, to refuse probation and undergo the
sentence.
[31] Id.-Probation-Conditions.-The trial judge does not have
power to impose in his probation orders the terms "that this
Court and Judge shall retain jurisdiction of this matter
throughout the . . . period of probation and no other department of the Court or other Judge shall modify this order
without notice to the Judge who tried the case"; the cause is
before the eonrt, not the individual judge, and the jurisdiction
which the judge exercises is the jurisdiction of the court, not
of the judge.
[32] Judges-Powers and Duties.-Rnles of court providing that
post-trial proceedings in a cause shall be heard by the judge
who tried the matter are proper, hut the individual judge cannot order that such procPedings must be heard by him.
[33] Criminal Law-Time of Trial and Postponement.-The continuance of a criminal case after the date set for trial when
civil cases were being tried in other departments did not
violate Pen. Code, §§ 68la ("The welfare of the people . . .
[29] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments,§ 357.

82

PEoPLE t'. OssLo

[50 C.2<1

requires that all proceeding~ in criminal cases shall be heard
and determined at the earliest possible time"), 1050 ("Criminal cases shall be given precedence over all civil matters and
proceedings"), where the continuance to enable trial to be held
in a certain department was not made for the purpose of improperly channeling the case into that department, but the
orderly administration of a crowded calendar required the
continuance to enable trial of the case in the proper department; the precedence to which criminal eases are entitled is
not of such an absolute and overriding eharaeter that the
system of having separate departments for eivil and eriminal
matters must be abandoned.

APPEAI1S from judgments of: the Superior Court of San
Diego County and from orders de11ying a new trial and granting probation. John A. IIewieker, Judge. ,Judgments and
order denying new trial affirmed; orders granting probation,
modified and affirmed.
Prosecution for conspiracy to commit assault and for m;sault
by means of force likely to prodme great bodily injury.
Judgments of conviction affirmed.
Aaron Sapiro, Charles M. Arak and Charles P. Scully for
Appellants.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Korman H.
Sokolow, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondrnt.
SCHAUER, J.-Defendants were charged with (count I)
"Conspiracy to Commit the Crime of Assault (PC 182)"
and (count U) ''Assault by Means of Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (PC 245)." A jury found them
guilty as charged. Imposition of sc•ntenee upon defendants
Osslo, McFaden, and Meyer was suspended and they were
granted probation. ,Judgments of conviction were entered
against defendants Hazel, Caeio, Dempster, Dimitratos, and
Tueker. Defendants' motion for new trial was denied. Defendants appeal, respectivdy, from the probation orders and
judgments, and from the order denying their motion for
new trial. They present a multifold attaek upon the orders
and judgments. Dt>fPndants urg(' that the Pvideiwe is insuffieient.; that tllrre was prejndieial error in the admission
and Pxelusion of evidPIWP; 1 hat the eharge of eons piracy to
commit the erime of assault is not a (·harge of a c1·irne known
to the laws of this state; that there was prejudicial mis-
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conduct of the prosecuting attorney; that the punishment
imposed upon defendants Osslo, MeFaden and 1\feyer is improper and excessive; and that the ease was erroneously
channeled into a particular department of the superior court.
For the reasons developed in the ensuing discussion we have
concluded that these contentions are without substantial merit
except that one of the terms, hereinafter described, of the
orders granting probation to Osslo, MeFaden, and Meyer is
erroneous, and that the orders should be modified by striking
out the erroneous provision.
The conduct and incidents involved in this prosecution
arose out of a jurisdictional dispute in San Diego County
between the local Butchers' Union and the local Retail
Clerks' Union. Preceding this dispute members of the Clerks'
Union employed in markets which stocked frozen and packaged dinners had handled the sale of such dinners. The
Butchers' Union determined that its members rather than
members of the Clerks' Union should have the handling of
the frozen dinners which included a meat or poultry serving, and demanded that the markets govern their employes
accordingly. The Butchers claimed "violation of contract"
by the markets permitting Clerks to continue handling the
dinner items and called a strike at one of the markets.
The Clerks endeavored to have the dispute settled through
legal proceedings. About October 5, 1955, the secretarytreasurer of the Clerks' local wrote ''to the market operators
informing them of the jurisdictional dispute and the stand
the Clerks were taking." Representatives of the Butchers
and the Clerks met a few days prior to October 12 (according
to one witness, prior to October 8). The secretary-treasurer
of the Clerks' local "made demand upon Mr. Osslo [who
held various offices, hereinafter detailed, with the Butchers]
to cause to have the merchandise in dispute at Ferguson's
market, as an example, placed back under the jurisdiction
of the Clerks, or our organization would take every legal
means necessary to t>nforce the jurisdiction." (Italics added.)
Osslo ''pounded the table three times, stated he was boss
of the \Vest Coast and he would fight for jurisdiction.''
On October 18, 1955, four days before the assault of which
defendants stand convictt>d, the Clerks filed with the National
Labor Relations Board a petition "for the purpose of having
the Board determine who the jurisdiction belonged to."
In contrast to the efforts of the Clerks to settle the controversy by legal proceedings, and inferentially to carry out
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the decJaration of Osslo that "he was boss of the vVest Coast
and he would fight for jurisdiction," the Butchers, assertedly
for the purpose of providing ''observers'' to accompany
Butchers' representatives and assist in "inspecting" markets
which were permitting, or suspected of permitting, grocery
clerks to sell the packaged foods, imported defendants Hazel,
Cacio, Dempster, Dimitratos, and Tucker, hereinafter sometimes called the sailor defendants, from San :F'rancisco and
started calling on the markets. 1 The hereinafter described
brutal assault and battery upon Maurer, a business agent
for the local Retail Clerks. followed.
The evidence, pertinent portions of which are hereinafter
summarized or quoted, is in some respects substantially conflicting, but in every respect is ample to support the verdicts.
If the jury believed the prosecution witnesses and disbelieved the testimonies of those defendants who took the stand,
they properly could have felt that the cumulative effect of
the evidence was not only sufficient, but overwhelming. Study
of the record constrains us to conclude that the latter view
is correct. [1] "The rule applicable where there is evidence,
circumstantial or othenvise, that a crime has been committed
and that the defendant was the perpetrator thereof, has been
many times reiterated by the reviewing courts of this state
as follows: The court on appeal 'will not attempt to determine the weight of the evidence, but will decide only whether
upon the face of the evidence it can be held that sufficient
facts could not have been found by the jury to warrant
the inference of guilt. For it is the function of the jury
in the first instance, and of the trial court after verdict, to
determine what facts are established by the evidence, and
before the verdict of the jury, which has been approved by
the trial court, can be set aside on appeal upon the ground'
of insufficiency of the evidence, 'it must be made clearly
to appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached
in the court below. .
We must assume in favor of the
verdict the existence of every fact which the jury could
1
The Clerks, too, had persons from elsewhere than San Diego assisting
them in connection with the jurisdictional dispute, but they were members of the Retail Clerks' Union and they did not become involved in
violence. ''They ac,companied the local business agents here on field
trips to observe where the merchandise was located in the markets that
was in dispute and to assist in making diagrams of the stores, also to
assist the local men in getting petitions signed to submit to the N a tiona!
Labor Relations Board.''
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reasonably dedueed from the evidence, and then determine whether sueh faets are suffieient to support the verdict.'
the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict of the
the opinion of the reviewing court that those circumstances might also reasonably be reeoneiled with the innoof the defendant ·will not warrant interference with
determination of the jury." (People v. Daugher·ty (1953),
Cal.2d 876, 885 [256 P.2d 911].)
Defendants' contentions require a rather extensive review
of the evidence in order that they may be viewed and resolved in fair perspective to the entire ease.
'Fhc Evide11cc. Jam!'s Ray ,Jackson, a business agent for
Butchers, testifi('d for the proseeution as a rather reluctant witness. His testimony, read as a whole, and in the
of the entire reeord, leads inevitably to the inferenee
that the sailor defendants, Dimitratos, Cacio, Tucker, Dempster, and Hazel, who were neither members of the Butchers'
Union nor residents of San Dic'go, were !'mployed by the
Butehers with the expectation that they would engage in
aets of violence, although in terms Jackson insisted that they
were employed merely as "observers." The substance of Jackson 's testimony is as follows:
,Jackson's duties as business manager were "to sign contracts, work on grievances, cheek violations" and "I do organizing . . . and any other work that is necessary to do.''
During the 18 years J aekson had been a member of the
Butchers, defendant Osslo had been secretary-treasurer of
the San Diego local to which Jaekson belonged. Osslo was
president of the \V estern Federation of Butchers, the affiliated
butchers' unions of California, and a member of the board
and executive committee of the International Butchers' Union
at the time of the assault and battery (October 22, 1955).
In ,Iune, 1956, Osslo was !'leeted vice president of the International. Membership in the Bnt!'hers in the United States
was about 300,000. Defendant MeFaden had been a business
agent of the San Diego local since 1941 and defendant Meyer
had been a business agent since 1955.
About Septemb!'r 8, 1955, there was a strike of the Butchers
at the Food Basket Market because of an assert!'d "violation
of eon tract" in that certain prepared and packaged complete
dinners included meat items and sueh packages were being
handled by the Clerks in the grocery department rather
than by the Butchers. Afl a result of the strike the Food
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Basket Market brought an injunction suit against the San
Diego local of the Butchers. The court ordered that the
disputed prepared dinners be taken off sale. It may be inferred that a purpose of the order was the prevention of the
sort of violent altercation which, as hereinafter related, forms
the basis of defendants' conviction of assault.
Concerning the relations between the Clerks and the
Butchers at the time of the Food Basket strike, Jackson testified as follows :
"Q. Now at Food Basket, . . . did you talk with the
Clerks representative while you were on strike at Food Basket,
by any chance~ A. Yeah, I guess we did. General conversation . . . .
'' Q. Let me ask you this: Were you present at any conferences at which any of the Clerks representatives discussed
the Food Basket situation with Mr. Osslo ~ A. Sir, I had
my foot broken the day before anything like that was discussed, I believe. . . .
'' Q. Do you, of your own knowledge, know whether or
not any discussions were held between Mr. Osslo and representatives of the Retail Clerks Union? A. 'When 7
'' Q. After and at about the time of the Food Basket incident. A. No, sir . . . . I don't know . . . .
"Q. Now when was the eon tract that was in effect at Food
Basket up for renewal~ A. November . . . .
"Q. Yes. Now what are your functions as a business
agent; just what do you do 7 A. My duties are to get-to
sign contracts, work on grievances, check violations. . . . I
do organizing, work on grievances, sign contracts, and any
other work that is necessary to do.''
On October 12, 1955 (a Wednesday), the Clerks struck
Ferguson's Market. Jackson and McFaden went to the market. Approximately 25 clerks were present, among them
Mr. Montgomery, hereinafter mentioned as one who was
attacked but succeeded in escaping serious injury in the subsequent assault of October 22, 1955. In addition to the members of the Butchers who worked at the market, defendant
McFaden, and ,Jackson, two or three other members of the
Butchers' Union were present. The Clerks "gave us [the
Butchers] some pretty good looks." Jackson felt that these
"looks" were threatening.
Discussions were had by the Butchers as to what they
would do at stores where the Clerks walked out. Defendant
Osslo was present at these discussions.
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f:)ailors Dimitratos and Hazel arriYed in San Diego by
airline from San Franeiseo on Saturda~·. October 15, 1955.
On the following Monday thPy mPt with ddendants McFaden
and MPyer and the witne;,;s ,Jaekson. Defendant Osslo had
previously stated that Harry Lundeberg "was sending a
l~ouple of fellows down to help us out, go with us, be our
observers. and see that we weren't jumped from behind, or
bothered." " I 'T] hey were to accompany us and work with
us." There were older, unemployed memb0rs of the Butchers
who eould have acted as observers bnt tht>y were not called
upon to do so. 'fhe sailors ''were going to observe and-'' Q. Observe what 'I A. Observe what was going on.
"Q. \Vhat were they to do after they observed what was
going on? A. To protect us and see that nobody created any
trouble or violence or anything of that sort."
The witness did not call the poliee for proteetion ; he did
not know whether anyone else had done so.
'' Q. \V ere the men from San Fram·iseo, the sailors, more
proficient, to your knowledge, than the San Diego Police
Department? A. \Vell, I don't know. MaybE' they might be
for labor work. They know what to look for.
'' Q. You mean that they are experienced in this type of
au action, or this matter? A. \Vhat action are you talking
about, sir?
'' Q. \V ell, in coming down and being observers. You mean
they were more experieueed in that line of work 7 A. I believe they would be.
"Q. Than a police officer might be 1 A. I believe they
would be, yes.
'' Q. In what respect would they be more proficient?
A. They worked iu labor for a good many years. That is
their job, working as laboring people.
'' Q. \Vhat are they going to observe? I am kind of interested in that. \Vhat are they going to observe that an
older dues paying member [of the Butchers] couldn't observe 1
A. They eould observe what goes on.
"Q. I see. In other words, what that takes is a good pair
of eyes? A. It takes a little brains, too.
"Q. \Vc'll, a man that has been a ma;;;ter craftsman and
worked up to a head meat eutter would have those qualifications, wouldn't he? A. Some might. Most of them might.
"Q. \Vhat were they to do after they observed? Were
they to make any reports? A. Yeah.
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'' Q. To whom were they to report~ A. I guess they would
make them to our Secretary 1
'' Q. Mr. Osslo 7 A. And to the IN estern Pedcration of
Butchers or the State Pederation of Labor . . . .
'' Q. \Vhat arc you looking for to observe? I am not clear
on that or on these reports. Did they make any reports, let
me ask you that? A. 'fhey reported on what they knew and
saw.
'' Q. They were oral reports, were they? A. Yes.
'' Q. How often did they make the reports? A. I guess
daily . . . .
"Q. \Vhat I am interested in, Mr. Jackson, is this: . . .
why, if you are looking for just observers to go around and
find out what is going on, didn't you give any preferential
treatment to the local people in San Diego in other unions?
A. Well, sir, not that I know of.
"Q. Here is what I >vant to know: why is the Sailors
Union selected as the ones you are going to go to to get
observers? A. \Vell, I would assume that the reason is-I
don't know for sure-these fellows are out on a ship and
they come back in and they have got time on their hands
waiting around for another ship.
'' Q. Did you check any other labor hiring halls here in
town, the laborers union, the plasterers union, or-- A. I
didn't.
'' Q. Do you know whether or not anybody else checked
any of the other labor hiring halls locally to see if there
were any people available that could be employed as observers?
A. I don't know, sir.
"Q. To your knowledge was that done? A. No, sir."
'' [\V] e had told the other labor organizations in San Diego
what was going on. Indirectly that is asking for help and
aid. As far as specifically asking for the loaning of a man
or two men or more, I don't know of that being done, sir."
'' Q. What did Mr. Osslo say about the two men that were
coming down, if anything? . . . A. He said they were coming down to go around with us. . . .
'' Q. What did you do when you went around to these
stores and what did they do to earn this $150.00 a week plus
expenses [the amount which the sailors were paid by the
Butchers]? A. They were with us . . . .
'' Q. Tell me what the work was they were doing? A.
Cherked the markets.
'' Q. What do you do when you eheck a market? How did
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know about a violation f They are sailors, aren't they 1
They know what they are looking for.
'' Q. \Vhat were they looking for 1 A. A violation of our
contract in the meat department.
"Q. How did they know a violation of a contract if they
flew in from San Francisco and had a short meeting
with you 1 Is it that easy that you can become a business
¥ A. As I said before, . . . they were here to go with
us, act as observers and to protect us in case there might
be any violence. . . .
"Q. If there was a contract violation. How would they
know what the contract was? A. \Ve would have to tell them.
'' Q. You would have to tell them what was in your contract? A. Point out the items, if there is a violation on the
items.
'' Q. These men are sailors and here is what I am confused
about, and I would think an old timer in the meat business
would have been important to you. \Vhat instructions did
you give these men from San Franr.isco that made them proficient in a short period of time to be able to observe these
contract violations, if there were any? A. The violations part
of it wasn't necessarily their objective to observe. They were
sent down here, or called down here, to protect us, as I said
before, and see we weren't jumped from behind, or jumped
at all.
"Q. And the services of the San Diego Police Department,
which are free, weren't ever used in that respect? . . . A. I
did not call the police department, no, sir . . . .
"Q. Were you in any way threatened 1 A. By certain
gestures, yes, sir.
"Q. When were you threatened by certain gesturrs T A. At
Tang's Market.
"Q. That is after Dimitratos and Hazel are with you,
isn't it? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. I am talking about before, before these men are hired
what gestures were made that caused you personally to feel
that you had been threatened. A. The incident at Ferguson's . . . . I was in the alley between the truck and the
building whrn several of them walked back ....
"Q. What did they do? A. Actually nothing but give
us a good look. . . .
"Q. That scared you? A. It could have been a threatening
look, yes, sir ....
"Q. Well, who did you report the threatening looks you
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got in the alley way at Perguson 's to? A. I believe they
were all reported to each other, Brother Osslo, myself and
Mack and Brother Meyer.
'' Q. Did you ever report those threatening looks to the
police department? A. I did not, no, sir.
'' Q. As a mattrr of fact, you weren't even concerned with
them, were you? A. Well, no, sir. . . . [After the question
was read and reread) I was concerned . . . .
"Q. You didn't report it to the police? A. 'l'here is not
much to report, sir.''
'' Q.... In the particular market how would they [Dimitratos and Hazel] know [which items were to be handled by
the Butchers], just walking into the place? A. They wouldn't
necessarily. They were with me or some of the rest of us .... ''
McFaden arranged for hotel reservations for Dimitratos and
Hazel and a few days later, when the additional three sailor
defendants ( Cacio, Tucker and Dempster) were imported
from San Prancisco, arranged for their reservations.
The sailor defendants each received $150 a week plus airline
transportation, hotel aceommodations and expenses from the
Butchers. The salary of a beginning apprentiee butcher was
$72 a week. The "top rate" which a journeyman butcher
was paid was $102 a week. A head meat cutter received $107
a week. Jackson, as business agent, received $140 a week.
Dimitratos and Hazel attended union meetings of the
Butchers. Such meetings were not open to the public but
"We have visitors. Anyone working for the organization is
permitted," and frequently visitors not connected with the
union were invited.
At Tang's (sometimes called Ming's) Market a representative of the Clerks assertedly threatened the witness .Jackson
by telling him that the Clerks "were taking everything that
bleeds, all the red meat, everything. That is not only a
threat to me, that is a threat on the organization, the way
I took it . . . .
"Q. Did you report it to the police department? A. No, sir.
"Q. Did you report it to Mr. Osslo? A. Yes, sir .... I reported to McFaden and he, in turn, reported it, and Mr.
Dimitratos and Mr. Hazel were there.''
At Tang's Market one Butlrr, a Clerk, assrrtrdly "displayed" a knifr. Counsel asked:
"Q. Now was there any display of a knife? A. Yes, sir ....
"Q. And what was Butler doing with the knife? A. Play-
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with it, fumbling it, handling it ... he [was) cleaning
his fingernails with it . . .
"Q. What did Butler do with the knife when you came
over ... and were introduced to him 1 A.. He didn't have the
knife in his hand at that time, sir." He had been "say
twelve to fifteen feet" away when the witness saw him with
the knife. Mr. Anderson, another representative of the
Clerks, ''came storming in,'' according to the testimony of
Dimitratos; the bulge of a gun was visible ''On his left arm
pit up in the shoulder ... You could just about see the shape
of it.'' But apparently no one claimed to have actually
seen a gun. The testimony of Mr. Jackson continues:
"Q. Did Mr. Anderson threaten you at all? A. Only in a
w·ay that he carried himself.
'' Q. How did he carry himself¥ A. Pushed his way through
. . the crowd, through the store.
'' Q. Who did he push ? A.. He didn't push anyone. I
say pushed his way through."
When Jackson's recollection was refreshed he admitted that
he had testified before the grand jury that at Tang's no
threats were made to him or in his presence .
.After the incidents at Tang's Market, defendants Cacio,
Tucker, and Dempster were also hired by the Butchers and
brought from San Francisco to San Diego.
At about 11 o'clock on the morning of October 22 the five
sailor defendants together with McFaden, Meyer, Jackson,
and one Woodard, an International representative of the
Butchers, went to Ferguson's Market. This was the first
occasion that Cacio, Dempster, and Tucker went out with
the Butchers. There was a slowdown in the meat department
for about 40 minutes. Ferguson's was said to be "one of the
sensitive points'' in the jurisdictional dispute. The group of
Butchers' representatives accompanied by their five sailor
employes then went to two other markets, in each of which
they remained only a few minutes. The sailors assertedly
were present ''as observers, witnesses, whatever you want to
call it." The group returned to Ferguson's Market and
''started a conversation" with one of the proprietors. Standing in the market were Montgomery and Maurer. The proprietor pointed out Montgomery and Maurer as Clerks.
[2] The testimony of various witnesses as to how many
of the sailors actively participated in the ensuing assault
and battery is conflicting. However, the following direct
evidence supports a determination that all five of the sailor
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defendants actively participated: These five defendants surrounded Clerks Montgomery and Maurer and some of the
defendants stomped on Montgomery's and Maurer's feet.
"Dimitratos and Hazel attempt [ ed] to get Montgomery, but
he . . . [though pursued] got away and they stepped right
back out . . . Maurer couldn't get . . . past the customers
because of a railing and a bunch of pushcarts . . . and he
was being pursued ... until two men got hold of him and held
him . . . " Cacio struck Maurer in the stomach. Dempster
and Tucker pinned Maurer's arms to his sides. "Dimitratos
judo chopped him terribly, fifteen or twenty shots,'' and
"Hazel was bombing in with his fists and with judo chops."
Maurer was beaten and kicked. '' [\V] hen they let go and
dropped him to the floor he was in kind of a hulk lying on his
side. That is when Cacio used the boots on him .... Kicked
him in the back twice and then he flopped over on his back
and he was kicked, I think, right in the side terribly hard.''
The witness then ''Checked to see if the police were called,
checked to see if the ambulance had been called.''
[3] Defendants' argument that there is no ''credible''
evidence that Dempster, Dimitratos, and Hazel participated
in the assault is obviously completely devoid of merit when
presented to a reviewing court. Such argument goes to the
weight of the evidence, and resolution of the conflicting evidence is for the trier of fact. (People v. Daugherty (1953),
supra, 40 Cal.2d 876, 885.)
McFaden, Meyer, Jackson, ·woodard, and the five sailor
defendants had gone to Ferguson's Market in two ears; some
of the Butchers and some of the sailors were in each car.
When they fled from the market after the assault and
battery, the sailors left in one car and the Butchers left
in the other car.
A cashier at the market had obtained the license number
of the car in which the sailors fled. A boy also attempted
to write down the license number but one of the defendants
snatched it from the boy's hand. Police officers, immediately
notified of the license number, stopped the car, arrested the
sailors, took them to the police station, and questioned them.
Defendant Dempster stated to the police that although he
had been at Ferguson's Market he knew nothing about a fight
there. He also falsely denied that he had any connection
with the Butchers. He stated that he had come from San
Francisco on a vacation.
Defendant Tucker at first refused to answer police questions
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about whether he had been at Ferguson's Market. He stated
that he had come to San Diego to do some drinking and to
visit Tia Juana. In a subsequent conversation with the
Tucker stated that he had been at Ferguson's Market
and that there had been a fight but denied that he or his
friends were involved in the fight. He also falsely denied that
the Butchers had hired him.
Defendant Dimitratos stated to the officers that he had come
to San Diego for a vacation; that neither he nor the group
he was with were involved in the fight to his knowledge. On
witness stand he admitted prior conviction of felony and
that he made false statements to the officers.
Defendant Cacio told the officerR that he had been drinking;
that he vaguely remembered being hit or kicked, but that
he did not remember hitting anyone. He denied knowing
who Jackson and defendant McFaden >Yere and also falsely
denied that he 1vas employed by the Butchers.
Defendant Hazel told the officers that he was in San Diego
on a vacation and had no interest in unions; that he and
defendant Dempstor had gone into F'erguson 's Market to buy
cough drops; that he knew nothing of any fight; and that he
did not know McF'aden or Jackson.
On November 27, 1955, defendant Moyer told a police
officer that he had not been at F'erguson's Market on
October 22.
[ 4] The foregoing statements of defendants to the officers
concerned matters which were within the defendants' own
knowledge, they related materially to the issue of their guilt
or innocence of the offenses of which they now stand convicted, and they were manifestly false through deliberate and
willful intent. Such falsifications cogently evidence consciousness of guilt and suggest that there is no honest explanation
for ineriminating circumstanees, and thus are admissions of
guilt. (l'coplc Y. Darmw (19:31), 212 Cal. 167. 177 [1]
P. 1]; People v. Tolson (1952), 109 Cal.App.2d 579, 581
[241 P.2d 32] ; People v. FarreU (1951), 107 Cal.App.2d
29 [2] [236 P.2d 424]; see also People v. Wayne (1953),
41 Cal.2d 814. 822-828 [4, 5] [264 P.2d 547]; conc:urring
opinion of Mr .•Justice 'l'raynor in People v. Albertson (1944),
2:J Cal.2d 550, 581-fi82 [147 P.2d 7].)
At the trial defendants Hazel, Dimitratos, Cacio, and
Dempster testified. Defendants Osslo, M:cF'aden, Moyer, and
Tueker did not take the fltand.
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The Butchers paid bail bond fees of $4,500 for the sailor
defendants. They paid $10,000 to a private investigator for
an investigation of this matter.
It must be borne in mind that the jurors not only heard
the evidence which has been summarized but also had the
benefit of observing the defendants and the witnesses from
day to day during the trial, and that the reeord shows the
reeeipt in evidenee of 59 exhibits. These exhibits indudc
pictures of the seene of the assault, reeords of telephone calls
among the defendants, and records of expenditures of the
Butchers on behalf of and to the sailor defendants.
Defendants do not dispute that the overt acts charged in
the conspiracy count of the indictment were proved. 2 But
they urge that it does not appear that these overt acts were
a part of a conspiracy. It is true that there is no direct evidence of a conspiracy: all the direct evidence bearing on the
question is to the effect that the defendants who actually
participated in the assault and batter.'' had been instructed to
avoid the use of violence. [5] But ''A conspiracy can generally be established only by circumstantial evidence. It is
not often that the direct fact of a common unlawful design
can be proved other than by the establishment of independent
facts bearing on such design." (People v. Robinson ( 1954),
43 Cal.2d 132, 136 [ 1] [271 P .2d 865] ; People v. Steccone
(1950), 36 Cal.2d 234, 237-238 [2, 3] [223 P.2d 17]; cases
'Those acts are as follows:
No. 1. That defendant Osslo had a conversation with Harry Lundeberg on October 13, 19iifi.
No. 2. That Dimitratos and Hazel came to San Diego on October
15, 1935.
No. 3. That McFaden, at the request of Osslo, made reservations for
three rooms about October 14.
No. 4. That McFaden, Dimitratos, and Hazel met on October 15.
No. 5. That Hazel and Dimitratos met at the Butchers' local on
October 17.
No. 6. That Dimitratos, Hazel, Meyer and other representatives of
the Butchers met at Tang's :Market on Oetober 18.
No. 7. That Dempster, Cacio, and Tucker met in San Diego on October 21.
No. 8. That Dempster, Caeio, •rucker, Dimitratos, and Hazel mot in
San Diego on October 21.
No. 9. That Dimitratos, Cacio, Tucker, Dempster, and Hazc-l accompanied McFnden and Meyer to :Ferguson's Market on October 22.
No. 10. That Dempster, Cacio, 'Tucker, Dimitratos, and Hazel were
in an automobile leased by the Butchers on October 22.
Nos. 11 through 15. That Osslo or McFadden agreed to pay each of
the sailor defendants a weekly salary and expenses.
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collected in 5 McKinney's New Calif. Digest, Conspiracy,
§ 23.)
Undisputed evidence establishes the following facts: After
the jurisdictional dispute between the Butchers and the
Clerks began, and prior to the assault here, prosecution witness ,Jackson and defendants Osslo, McFaden, and Meyer,
and representatives of the Butchers, met with representatives
of the Clerks; Osslo said that the Butchers were going to
"show" the Clerks; he said that he was "top man" on the
west coast and "that was it." Anticipating violence-assert<'dly that representatives of the Butchers would be "jumped"
by the Clerks-Osslo, through the Sailors Union of the Paeiik, imported and employed the :five sailor defendants, and
defendants McFaden and Meyer assented to their employment.
Dimitratos, Hazel, 'rucker, and Dempster had been members
of the Sailors Union of the Pacific for a number of years,
and Cacio, a 'reamster, had sailed in the Merchant Marine.
Members of the Sailors Union of the Pacific had participated
in other labor disputes to which that union was not a party
and had committed an assault and battery in connection with
onr such dispute.
[6] It is a reasonable inference that Osslo, McFaden, and
Meyer, who had been actively and extensively engaged in
union affairs, knew of such participation and assault and
battery. Pretending concern for their own safety, but never
asking police protection, OsRlo, with the assent and aid of
McPaden and Meyer, set up a situation which inferentially
was designed to, and which elearly did, increase the likelihood of violence in the jurisdictional dispute. On a view of
the evidence favorable to the prosecution, which the law at
this stage of the proceeding requires of us, it is fairly inferrible that Osslo, McFaden, and Mryer at least tacitly understood, anticipated, and agreed that the remaining :five
defendants would not merely be present to act as "observers"
and prott>ct the Butchers from violence, but would and should
initiatE' the violence, which they subsequently did initiate, to
"Rhow" the Clerks that Osslo indeed "was boss of the West
Coast and he would :fight for jurisdiction" and "that was it."
Admission and Rejection of Evidence. [7] Defendants
urge that it was prejudicial error to admit evidence that members of the Sailors Union of the Pacific participated in other
labor disputPs to which that union was not a party, 'lnd
that some of such members (not the defendants here) were
guilty of assault and battery in connection with their partici-
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pation in such a dispute. 'l'his evidence, m the light of the
other circumstances, including the prior activities of Osslo,
:M:c:Faden, and JYieyer, was properly admitted as tending to
show that the last named defendants contemplated that the
employment of the sailor defendants probably wonk! result
in acts of violence by the latter defendants.
[8] Evidenee was received concerning :fights, unconnected
with union aetivities, in 1951 involving Dimitratos and in
1952 involving Dimitratos and Dempster. The evidence was
expressly reeeived as to the eonspiracy charge only. The
trial judge so instructed the jury at the time it was admitted.
He further then instrueted them that if they believed the
evidence ''it would only teud to show the eharaeteristies of a
particular defendant in this case, and if that charaeteristie
goes to the offense and if a eonspiracy is shown, it would be
binding on all the defendants so far as the eonspiracy eount
is eoneerned." The theory on whieh this evidence was reeeived is erroneous. That Osslo, with :M:eF'aden and Meyer,
employed persons who had previously partieipated in :fights
unconnected with union activity does not tend to show that
those persons were hired with the expeetation that they would
eommit assaults connected with union activity, for there is
no showing that Osslo, :M:cFadcn, or Meyer knew of the 1951
and 1952 altercations. However, in view of the ample evidence
that Dimitratos and Dempster participated in the assault and
battery here material, and in the light of the circumstances
surrounding their importation and employment, it does not
appear that the jury could have been misled by evidence that
they had been involved in other altercations.
[9] Defendants complain of the admission of evidence of
many telephone calls between the defendants and other members of their organizations. 'fhis evidence was properly received to show defendants' association; that that association
was criminal is shown by the other evidenee, viewed as a
whole.
[10] Defendants complain of the admission in evidence of
the testimony of a police officer concerning the arrest of
Clerks Anderson and ·weathers on November 1, 1955, after
the assault of which defendants were convicted. This testimony was as follows: Defendant Osslo told the officer that
his life had been threatened by Anderson. The offieer located
Anderson and Weathers was with him. At the officer's request
Anderson and ·weathers aeeompanied the officer to the police
station. The district attorney, after deputies examined an
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affidavit furnished by the Butchers on which their charge was
based, refused to take action in the matter. The city prosecutor filed charges against Anderson, but they were dismissed. This testimony tends to show that defendant Osslo,
after the assault, attempted to harass the Clerks by unsubstantiated accusations and to distract emphasis from the
charges against him by countercharges; it was thus admissible
as tending to show that Osslo was a conspirator carrying on an
effort to make good his declaration that he "was boss of the
West Coast and he would fight for jurisdiction,'' and not,
as he argues, the innocent employer of persons who were to
act as ''observers'' or at the most to show the Clerks that the
Butchers were protected, without the exercise of force.
[11] Defendants complain that the trial judge refused to
permit Jackson to testify that on October 13, 1955, defendant
:McFaden reported to Jackson and defendant Osslo that he
had been frightened by a group of Clerks at Ferguson's
:Market. This testimony was relevant to the purpose of the
employment of the sailor defendants and should have been
admitted, but in the light of the entire record its exclusion
certainly did not prejudice defendants.
The Crime of Conspiracy to Commit Assault. Defendants
urge that the charge of ''Conspiracy to Commit the Crime
of Assault (PC 182) " is not a charge of a crime under the
laws of this state because no statute prescribes a punishment
for such a crime. Section 182 of the Penal Code provides in
material part:
"If two or more persons conspire:
"1. To commit any crime. [Subdivisions 2 through 6 enumerate specified objects of criminal conspiracy.) . . .
"They are punishable as follows: (The next three paragraphs prescribe the punishment for conspiracy to commit
crimes against certain officials, for conspiracy to commit any
other felony, and for conspiracy to commit two or more
felonies which have different punishments.] . . .
''When they conspire to do any of the other acts described
in this section they shall be punishable by imprisonment in
the county jail for not more than one year, or in the State
prison for not more than three years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ( $5.000) or both."
[12] According to defendants, conspiracy to commit a
misdemeanor assault is not one of the acts ''described in
this section.'' But, as defendants concede, it was held in
50 C.2d-4
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Doble v. Superior Court (19251, l!l7 CaL
565 12J [241
P. 852] (where the question was whether section 182 of the
Penal Code provided punishment for a conspiracy to violate
the Corporate Securities Act), that ''it was the legislative
intention that the words 'any crime' should include all
crimes-whether felonies or misdemeanors-which are known
to the laws of this state and whether defined and made punishable by the Penal Code or by any other law or statute of
this state," and ( p. 566 [ 5] of 197 Cal.) "the words 'any
of the other acts described in this section' were meant to,
and do in fact, include all other conspiracies to commit crimes
or acts prohibited by the section [182] regardless of whether
they are denounced by subdivision 1 or any other subdivision
thereof." We conclude that the Doble case is applicable here.
Misconduct of the District Attorney. Certain specifications
of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney, hereinafter discussed, present the most nearly substantial basis for attacking the verdicts, but the evidence so overwhelmingly supports
the implied findings that it does not appear reasonable to
believe that the misconduct was a contributing factor in the
jury's arriving at such verdicts.
[13] Defendants complain of a press release of the prosecuting attorney which was published before trial. This press
release stated that the defendants were attempting to delay
trial. In this connection the record indicates that on the
day the case was to have gone to trial in the regular criminal
department (Department 4), that department was engaged
in a trial. The presiding judge in Department 2 was willing
to select a jury to be used for actual trial in Department
4 and for that purpose the case was transferred from Department 4 to Department 2. Defense counsel announced
defendants' willingness to be tried in Department 2, either
with or without a jury, but objected to having a jury selected
by one judge and then having the actual trial proceed before
another judge. The case was thereafter continued in Department 2 from time to time for a week until Department 4 was
available for selection of the jury and further trial. The
press release to the effect that defendants were attempting to
delay the trial appears unfair; defendants were merely objecting, as they had a right to do, regardless of whether their
objection was or was not meritorious, to the procedure (described by the presiding judge as ''standard procedure in
this County") of having a jury selected by one judge and the
actual trial conducted by another judge. However, it does
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not appear that the newspaper statement prejudiced defendants in the eyes of the jury which tried their case. The trial
judge, in accord with the request of defendants' counsel, speeifieally admonished the jurors to pay no attention to this
artide and generally admonished them to pay no attention to
newspaper articles.
[14] During the voir dire examination of the prospective
jnrors the prosecuting attomey asked such questions as, "You
don't believe that might makes right?,'' ''And do you feel
that a pt>rRon, beeanse he is a member of a labor union,
deserves to get beat 11p ouce in a while?," and "You wouldn't
permit sympathy or the feE' ling to 'let 't-> give him another
dwnee' to iufluenee your deeision in this matter~" These
questions, of which defendants complain, were not improper;
they were designed to dicit relevant information concerning
the prospective jurors' state of mind. (15] The question,
''You know a clerk was beaten'?," of which defendants cornplain, was not in the circumstances improper and certainly
c·ould not be prejudicial; the fact was indubitably established
and it concerned the very subject of the assault charge which
the jurors were being selected to try. Other questions complained of by defendants need not here be quoted; they were
('ither prop0r or not prejudieial.
[16] Complaint is made of the following matters in the
proseenting attorney's opening statement: The prosecuting
attorney said, '' lH r. Max .J. Osslo was a member of the 1955
Grand Jury that returned the indictment.'' Defense counsel,
moving to strike the statement, said, ''Although everybody
knows that, it is ineompet0nt, irrelevant and immaterial." In
Yiew of the concession that "everybody knows that" it does
not appear that the mention of the fact before the jury could
have prejudiced defendants.
[17] The prosecuting attorney stated at some length details c·oncerning the secretary-treaRurer of another Butchers'
loeal being ''worried about Osslo and worried about goons.''
Evidenee conc0rning this matter was subsequently excluded.
It does not appear that the refer0nce to the matter could
Jurn: pr0j ndiced defN1dan ts. This and other references to
"goons" by the prosecuting attorney wer0 no more improper,
in the light of the evidence developed by the prosecution,
than would be a r0ferrnee to "thiev<'S" in a rase in which
1lef1'11dants ·were on trial for larceuy.
[18] 'l'he trial judge instructed the jury before the taking
of evidence began, as well as at the dose of the case. In the
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course of his preliminary instruction he commenced to read
an instruction concerning assault with a deadly weapon which
the prosecuting attornry had incorrectly included in his requested instructions. The judge immrdiately stopped reading
and asked the prosecuting attorney if it was his contention
that a deadly weapon was used. The attorney answered,
"No. By means of fol'(:e," but then said, "A prize fighter is
a weapon?'' 'fhis remark or query was improper, as was
the request for an instruction concerning assault with a
deadly weapon. But these incidents, not persisted in before
the jnry, do not appear to have been prejudicial.
[19] Defendants complain that during the course of trial
the prosecution brought into the courtroom and the sight of
the jury a board on whirh were pictures referred to by counsel
as "rogue's gallery" photographs of the defendants, made
at the time of their arrest. The court declined to permit
the use of these photographs in evidence. It is defendants'
position that the prose(·ution, knowing that the photographs
were improper, brought them into the courtroom in a manner
such that the jury saw thrm and were prejudiced. The
record does not disclose that the jury saw these photographs
clearly or at length, but only that there was a di:;;pute between
prosecution and defense counsel as to whether they could
readily have been seen by the jury. In the cireumstances,
even assuming that the jury did see the photographs, it is
not shown that defrndants were harmed. The jury were
clearly and repeatedly instructed that they must determine
the facts from the evidence produced in court, and that they
must not consider any offer of evidence which was rejected
by the court.
[20] Objeetion was made and sustained to two questions of
the prosecution as to whether Mr. Lunde berg supplied ''strong
arm men" for use in labor disputes. The use of the term
"strong arm men," in the light of the evidence of circumstances under which the sailor defendants were employed by
the Butchers, appears more realistic than prejudicial. In a
pretrial statement of defpndant Osslo in connection with his
motion to quash the indictment it is admitted that "Osslo
turned to Harry I~undeberg for help. 'fhis procedure in
labor circles is not considered unusual. The mere presence
of some formidable appearing men to accompany his business
representatives he felt both would 'offset the pressure' and
reduce the possibility of' designs of injury.' "
[21] A witness testified that a person whom she had seen
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the timP of the assault "iR tlw sPeond gentleman," inditing tJw rlcfrll(]ant CIJCin. The: prnsr••nting aitnrnr:v >:aid,
r
to ihe USP of thP word 'grntlr>mau.'" Iu r·ontrast

to \Yhat neeurred in People v. WilliaiJJS ( 19-12), 55 Cal.App.
2d 696,700-702 [181 P.2d 8311, the trial juclge hr>re immerehuked the prosr>euting attorney and admonished the
to disregard his remark. In the eirnnnstauees, the rebuke and admonishment appear suffi<,ient to <·ure any harm
whieh might have resulted from the proseenting attorney's
hig·hly improper remark, and the 'Williams ease is not authori1 to the contrary.
[22] A poliee officer tcstifled that he saw two of the sailor
ddelldants in Osslo 's offiee. 'l'he prosecuting attorney asked,
"As a matter of fact, if you hadn't seen them in Osslo 's
offiee yon would have run them out of town 7'' This question
followed the offieer 's testimony that "I didn't like a eouple of
big, huslry men walking around as bodyguards and gave the
appea.ranee of being toughs of the worst sort.'' Defense
l'Otmsel objeeted that the prosecuting attorney's question was
n1 iscomluet and the trial judge said, "'I' hat is uncalled for,
1\Ir. 0 'I-'aughlin [the prosecuting attorney]. Don't repeat it.
Proceed." It does not appear, in the light of the trial
judge's rebuke, and of the faets that the jurors had ample
opportunity to determiw~ from personal observatiou whether
the defendants were ''big, huRky men,'' and were admonished
that they must deeide the issues of fact on the evidence before
them, not upon remarks of counsel, that the improper question
was prejudicial.
[23] 'rhe proseeutiug attorney asked defendant Dimitratos, when Dimitratos was tr>stifying, ''As a matter of fact,
any time IJundcberg gets in any type of dispute that he is
out for a jurisdictional grab it is the old Communist slogan
hr uses-~.'' DE'fense coun:wl i11ierrupted with an ohjeetion
and the trial judge sustained the objretion and direeted the
jury to "disregard it." In the eireumstanees the interrupted,
improper question docs not appear to have been prejuclieiaL
[24] 'fwiee defense counsel objected to the prosecuting
attorney's "yelling" at the defendant Caeio while Caeio was
being (•ross-examined. On eac:h oeeasion the trial judge
replied that the prosecuting attorney could use any tone of
voice which he wished to use. Although conceivably there
eould be circumstances under whieh the court's ruling might
be questionable, it is not shown that the asserted "yelling"
intimidated the witness or harmed defendants. Hence, we
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cannot determine that the ruling was either erroneous or
prejudicial.
[25] In closing argument the prosecuting attorney referred to a case in which "a man died in the gas chamber"
because of a battery, assertcdly similar to that administered
to the elerk Maurer by the flailor defendants, whi~h resulted
in the death of a woman. The judge promptly admonished
the prosecuting attorney to "Confine yourself to this case."
It does not appear that the defendants were harmed by the
reference to the homicide case.
[26] Defendants complain of the reference of the prosecuting attorney to Mr. Lundeberg and Mr. Jackson as "unindicted co-conspirators.'' 'l'he reference, although unfair to
those gentlemen in the sense that they were not before the
court and thus were not in a position to answer the charge,
could not have been prejudicial to the defendants. It suggested only that entirely tenable view of the evidence which
was taken by the prosecuting attorney and which we must
presume was taken by the jury. Hence it did not constitute
misconduct.
[27] The prosecuting attorney in argument stated, ''Meyer
is the finger man.'' \V e have discovered no evidence to this
effect. It appears that any prejudicial effect of the reference
was corrected by the trial judge's prompt admonition that
"The jury will remember the evidence .... [I] f the evidence
isn't there the inference isn't there and they will disregard it.''
It is to be noted that the prosecuting attorney at the beginning of his argument said, ''what I am about to say is not
evidence and if, in any way your version of the evidence is
different than mine, you please take your own version of it."
And the judge clearly and repeatedly instructed the jury that
they were to decide the case on the basis of the evidence and
further clearly instructed them that arguments of counsel
were not evidence. 3
[28] Defendants object to statements in argument of the
prosecuting attorney that Mr. Lunde berg was "a bed fellow
3
The judge told the jury, among other things, that "it is up to you to
determine what the facts are from the evidence introduced at the trial.
. . . You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in this
trial and the law as stated to you by me . . . . [Y]ou must determine
the facts from the evidence produced here in court,'' and ''argument of
counsel on both sides is not evidence . . . . Whatever they say about
the evidence, if you find that to be true, why you follow it. If whatever
either side said about the evidence doesn't correspond with your views
as you heard the evidence as it came in, why you disregard any comments
they made and follow the evidence as you see it.''
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of Harry Bridges," that "It is two per cent his [Lundeberg's] fight against Communism and ninety eight per cent
his grab for jurisdictional power,'' and other similar statements. These statements were made in reply to defense counsel's argument that "The Sailors Union was the only thing
that stood between complete Communist control of the Maritime industry since 1935 and Harry Lundeberg personally
was responsible for that on every occasion. He held that
Sailors Union right and the Sailors Union had to fight in
order to hold itself to keep from coming under the Bridges'
control, as every other Maritime Union did." In the circumstances the statements of the prosecution were not prejudiciaL
[29] The Conditions of Probation. Defendants argue that
the conditions of probation exceeded the trial judge's power
bv reason of the provision that defendants Osslo, McFaden,
a~d Meyer shall not, during the 10-year probationary period,
hold any union position or receive remuneration from any
union. However, since it could be and presumably was found
that these defendants are guilty of crimes growing out of
union activities, it appears not improper that restrictions be
placed upon such activities as a condition of probation.
[30] The granting of probation is entirely within the
sound diseretion of the trial court; a defendant has no right
to probation; he does have the right, if he feels that the terms
of probation are more harsh than the sentence imposed by
law, to refuse probation and undergo such sentence. (People
v. Frank (1949), 94 Cal.App.2d 740,741-742 [211 P.2d 350).)
In the Frank case the defendant, a pediatrician, was convicted
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor by a lewd act
committed on a child in a plaster cast. It was held proper
that the terms of his probation include the requirement that
defendant not praetice medicine during the five years he was
on probation. The court specifically rejected the argument,
similar to the argument of defendants Osslo, MeFaden, and
Meyer here, that the condition of probation was unreasonable
and beyond the power of the court.
Defendants are mistaken in their argument that the trial
judge imposed on Osslo, McFaden, and Meyer county jail
sentences and independently of such sentences granted periods
of probation. Each probation order expressly suspends imposition of sentence and provides that probation is granted
on the condition, among others, that defendant spend a designated number of months in the county jail.
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[31] It does not appear that the trial judge had power to
impose the following terms in his probation orders: "that
this Court and Judge shall retain jurisdiction of this matter
throughout the said period of probation and no other department of the Court or other Judge shall modify this order
without notice to the Judge who tried the case." An individual judge (as distinguished from a court) is not empowered to
retain jurisdietion of a cause. The cause is before the court,
not the individual judge of that court, and the jurisdiction
whieh the judgc> c>xercises is tbe jurisdiction of the eourt, not
of the judge. [32] Rules of court which provide that posttrial proceedings in a cause shall be heard by the judge who
tried the matter arc entirely proper, but the individual judge
cannot order that such proeeedings must be heard by him.
The Asserted Channeling of the Case into a Par-ticular Department. By stipulation this ease was set for trial on July
9, 1956. All proceedings up to and including the making of
the stipulation were had in Department 4 (Judge John A.
Hewieker). The minutes of Department 4 show that on
.July 9 the cause was transferred to Department 2 (Presiding
Judge Turrentine) for trial. Actually, the reporter's transcript shows, the transfer was for the purpose of selecting
a jury only. The reporter's transcript further shows that, as
already indicated, defense counsel refused to accede to the
procedure of having a jury selected in Department 2 while
the trial then pending in Department 4 was being completed
and tben having the eause transferred to DepartmPnt 4 for
completion of trial. Defense counsel moved that the cause
be assigned to any available department for immediate trial.
The court stated, "Motion granted, and the first court available will be Judge Hewicker, the regular criminal department . . . . [T]he case will be continued until two o'clock at
which time the defendants, and all attorneys, and the jury is
asked to return. If \Ve are not ready then, why we will have
to have continuances half a day at a time until we have a court
available to try this case. I can't tell you exaetly when that
will be, but the case in ,Judge Hewicker's court may terminate
at any moment ... or it may take the rest of the week, but
there is no alternative to that procedure ... " Defense counsel ohjerted to the l'Ont inuanee ''on the gronud that there are
courts available and that there is going to be a civil trial
to be started in one of the Superior Courts this morning, and
a criminal case has precedence over a criminal [sic] ease."
The court said, "Objection overruled."
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The cause was r:ontinued two or three times each day until
16 when selection of a jury began in Department 4
before ,Judge Hewicker. On numerous oceasions defense
counsel objected to the <'Ontinnan<'es, point,•d out that eivil
eases were commenced in other departments and that a jury
had been selected in another department to try a criminal case
which was originally set for trial later than defendants'
ease, and urged that the continuances were "part of the plan
to channel a case into a particular court.''
,Judge 'l'urrcntine, in overruling one of defense eounsel's
objections to a continuance, explained at some length the
reasons for the continuances. He said that "the case was
originally pending in that Department [4] and was to go to
trial there and it was only sent to this Department by Judge
IIewicker for the purpose of getting a jury to try the case ....
n view of the objection to me trying-to me selecting a
jury the only thing that could logically happen would be
that it would go back to the Department where it originated
and should be because Department 4 is the Presiding Criminal
Department, and I am complying with the suggestion and
request of Judge Hewicker."
Judge Turrentine further stated that the selection of a jury
by a department other than the one in which the case was
to be tried ''is almost routine in this County. So we assumed
. . . that on July 9th we would proceed in this Department
to srlect the jury in order to give you a speedy trial and
this was done at the request and suggestion of Judge Hewicker.
It necessitated a very considerable rearrangement of business
in this County to do it. \Ve have four regular judges either
away or assigned to duty on the District Court of Appeal,
and, of course, we have the rather long trial in Department 4
going on. It is our general policy in criminal cases to give
preference to the trial of those criminals who are incarcerated
iu jail so if they are deprived of their liberty unlawfully they
may have their day in court and get out in preference to those
who have the financial means to make bail . . . [Defendants
were at liberty on bail.] If it were not for the fact that we
had members of the San Diego County Bar who were willing
to serve as Judges pro tem without compensation to themSPlves we would just simply be bogged down with nothing but
a number of these short jury trials where the defendants are
in jail awaiting trial.''
'fhe judge went on to explain the condition of the calendar
in various departments, pointing out that a jury trial of a
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person confined as mentally ill was being had in one department, that the juvenile calendar was ''very congested,'' and
that ''today we have three criminal trials going on out of
five regular judges, one regular and two pro tems . . . ''
[33] Defendants contend that the eontinuanee of the ease
after the date set for trial, when eivil eases were being tried in
other departments, was in violation of seetion 681a of the
Penal Code ("The welfare of the people of the state of
California requires that all proeeedings in eriminal eases
shall be heard and determined at the earliest possible time.
It shall be the duty of all eourts and judieial offieers and of
all district attorneys to expedite the hearing and determination of all such eases and proeeedings to the greatest degree
that is consistent with the ends of justiee") and the provision
of section 1050 of that code that ''Criminal cases shall be
given preeedence over all civil matters and proceedings.''
It does not appear that the poliey of sections 681a and
1050 was disregarded. Judge Turrentine's explanation of the
condition of the calendar shows that defendants were not
being deprived of precedence over civil cases for any arbitrary
reason and that the continuanees to enable trial in Department
4 were not made for the purpose of improperly channeling the
case into that department. Rather, it appears that the orderly
administration of a crowded calendar required the continuances to enable trial of the case in a proper department. The
precedence to which criminal cases are entitled is not of such
an absolute and overriding charaeter that the system of
having separate departments for civil and criminal matters
must be abandoned. And certainly it does not appear, as
defendants suggest, that the "channeling" of this cause to Department 4, where it had been from its inception, was an
improper channeling to a particular judge as an individual
rather than as the judge of the presiding criminal department.
For the reasons above stated, the provisions by which the
individual judge purported to retain jurisdiction of the cause
are stricken from the orders granting probation. In all other
respects such orders, and the judgments and order denying
a new trial, are affirmed.
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
This case demonstrates, more than any other which has
come under my observation, the abuse of our conspiracy stat-
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ute. 'While the statute has a salutary objective, it may become
a weapon in the hands of an overzealous prosecutor to make
felonies out of mere misdemeanors and thus inflict great injustice upon people who are entirely innocent of any crime,
but who may have had some connection or association with a
person who has committed a misdemeanor. Under the holding
of the majority in this case, it would be possible to obtain a
felony eouvietion against all five occupants of an automobile
for illegal parking, a misdemeanor, for whieh the driver of the
ear was entirely responsible. Take the ease where a eity
ordinanee prohibits parking within 10 feet of a fire plug-a
car with five persons in it parks within the restricted zone. A
poliee offieer arrests all five occupants on the theory that the
illegal parking was the result of an agreement between themconspiraey to violate the parking ordinance. Under the majority holding here, the mere presence of the five in the automobile would give rise to a permissible inference of conspiraey
to violate the parking ordinance and all five could be prosecuted and convicted of conspiracy which is a felony under
section 182 of the Penal Code (People v. JJialotte, 46 CaL2d
59 [292 P.2d 517]) and all five could be sentenced to a state
prison even in the face of their uncontradicted testimony that
none of them except the driver had anything to do or say
about the parking of the car. Sueh an outrageous travesty
would be no greater than the proseeution, verdicts, judgments,
sentences and affirmance of the judgments in this case. The
foregoing statement is based upon the undeniable faet that
there is not oue word of testimony or any evidence in the
record in this ease of any agreement or understanding between any of the defendants that any crime would be eommitted by any defendant or that any eonspiracy existed between them to violate any law, and there is no basis whatever
for an inference that sueh a conspiraey existed.
The majority has quoted extensively from the testimony of
some of the witnesses, but in all of this testimony there is not
even a suggestion that there was an agreement or understanding between the defendants that any of them would commit
a crime or that there was a plan, design or scheme to violate
any law in any respeet whatsoever, and the majority opinion
does not refer to any evidenee iu the reeord which even
remotely gives rise to an inference that a conspiraey existed
between the defendants to violate a law.
'!.'rue, a misdemeanor may have been committed by one or
more of the defendants, but it requires something more than
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legal reasoning or judicial interpretation to find evidence of
a conspiracy between the defendants that any defendant
should engage in the commission of an unlawful act.
The record shows that a jurisdictional dispute existed in
San Diego County between the local butchers' union and the
local retail clerks' union. The butchers' union was of the
opinion that its members should handle certain merchandise
such as frozen TV dinners rather than members of the clerks'
union. Defendant Osslo was secretary-treasurer of the butchers' local, McFaden and Meyer were business agents for the
same union. Four of the other five defendants were members
of the Sailors Union of the Pacific and Cacio was a member
of the Teamsters Union who had come from San Francisco
to San Diego to accompany and protect the business agents
of the butchers' local. The five defendants arrived in San
Diego several days prior to October 22, 1955 and were in
contact with Osslo, McPaden and Meyer; they attended a
butchers' union meeting on October 21st. The record shows
that these five defendants were paid weekly by the butchers.
The altercation out of which this case arose took place in
Ferguson's Market in Chula Vista. The facts giving rise to
the fight in which one Maurer, a retail clerk, was struck and
injured are hotly disputed and present a very close question.
Defendants' major contentions are these :
(1) That there is no evidence that they conspired to commit
assault;
(2) That the district attorney was guilty of prejudicial
misconduct in numerous instances;
( 3) That the court committed prejudicial error in the
admission and exclusion of certain evidence;
( 4) That the punishment imposed as to defendants Osslo,
McFaden and Meyer is improper, excessive and unauthorized
under the laws of the state and constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Constitution.
The evidence, fairly stated, is as follows:
Early in September, 1955, there had been a strike of the
butchers at the Pood Basket Market in Pacific Beach which
was authorized by Osslo, who was secretary-treasurer of the
local union as well as the President of the \V estern Pederation
of Butchers, and the executive board. This strike arose over
some 23 disputed items containing meat which were handled
in the grocery department. After the strike in which about
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20 persons were involved, the market brought an action for an
injunction, and after the hearing, the items were taken off
sale. On October 13, 1953, there was a retail clerks' strike at
Ferguson's Market and there were pickets carrying signs.
Outside the market, there were about 25 persons including
business agents for the clerks and butchers, as well as some
butchers employed elsewhere. Defendants Osslo, MeFaden
and Meyer claim that they were threatened at this time by
members of the clerks' union and that as a result Harry
Lundeberg of the Sailors Union of the Pacific was contacted
and requested to send some men to accompany them during
their rounds of checking contracts to see that they were not
jumped from behind or injured by members of the clerks'
union. Defendants Dimitratos and Hazel arrived in San
Diego and reported to 1\IcFaden and on October 19th accompanied Jackson (butchers' union) and Meyer to Tang's
market where they were, apparently, threatened by a member
of the clerks' union who had a switch-blade knife and an
outsider who had a gun. Osslo was contacted in Honolulu and
advised Dimitratos to get some additional assistance which he
did in the persons of Dempster, Cacio and Tucker.
On October 22nd, Osslo, McFaden and Meyer, accompanied
by the five other defendants, visited several markets in San
Diego. 'I'hey arrived at Perguson 's Market at about 11 o'clock
in the morning for the purpose of seeing one Linnville, partner and manager of the market. They were told to return at
1 o'clock. At 1 o'clock Dimitratos, Cacio, Hazel, Jackson,
Meyer, vVoodard, Dempster, Tucker and McFaden returned
and went into the market. McFaden, Jackson and Meyer
stayed near the entrance talking to Linn ville; Hazel went to
the back to talk to a young lady in the delicatessen department
(the young lady testified that Hazel was with her at the time
of the assault) ; Dimitratos went to the back and observed
the meat department at the right; Tucker and Cacio, who
had been to Tia Juana the night before and who had been
drinking heavily, went in search of buttermilk and when they
did not find it turned back and came across Maurer and Montgomery who were representatives of the Clerks from outside
San Diego. Defendants claim that as Dempster walked past
them, followed by Tucker and Cacio, Maurer put his foot
out; that Dempster saw it and stepped over it, but that Tucker, thinking Maurer was trying to trip him, stepped on
Maurer's foot; that Maurer struck at Tucker and missed and
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hit Caeio; that Uado struek baek at whieh time Mann'r
grabbed Caeio by the testides and lifted him off the ground;
that 'l'ueker and CaC'io then struck Maurer nntil he dropped
Cacio and Maurer went down; that Cacio and Tucker thought
Maurer was reaching for a gnu and 'l'ucker kicked him until
he was knocked out. Dempster came back and caught Caeio
who was in great pain. Montgomery had disappeared at the
first sign of trouble.
Dempster took Cacio whose trousers were torn and who was
in pain to one of the two cars. He then asked McFaden for
the keys and Dimitratos, Hazel, Cacio and Dempster then
drove off looking for the Ace Motel where they were staying.
They lost their way and \Yere picked up by the police who
found that Cacio and 'l'ueker had been drinking and noted
Cacio 's condition and that of 'l'ueker 's hands. Maurer arrived
at the police station that afternoon and identified them.
A bakery clerk at the market said that Tucker, Cacio and
Dempster were the ones responsible for the beating. Maurer's
testimony implicated Dimitratos in the fight; and showed that
he thought he had hit Cacio in the stomach; that up until the
time he was called a foul name and had been hit he did nothing at all to provoke a fight; that he and Montgomery had
been trying to leave the store when they were ''surrounded''
by men. An organizer for the Clerks testified that Dempster
was also in the fight; that Dimitratos and Hazel attempted to
''get'' Montgomery by chasing him.
The record contains testimony from both members of the
clerks' and butchers' unions who were working iu the market.
A member of the Butchers testified that Maurer was "looking
for trouble" on the day in question. The Clerks, on the other
hand, testified that Maurer was just standing and minding
his own business. It is obvious from the record that the testimony from both sides of the c-ontroversy was diametrically
opposed.
The police officers testified that they had been alerted by
radio from the Chula Vista police department; that when they
stopped the car, Cacio, Dempster, Dimitratos and Tucker got
out; that Cacio and 'l'ucker said that "someone" had been
reaching for a gun; that Tucker's hand was red and swollen;
that Cacio's trouser leg was torn in two places at the thigh
and that the men had been drinking. Dempster stated to the
police that he had come from San Francisco on a vacation
with his friends Tucker and Cacio; that he knew Dimitr-atos
was in San Diego; that he did not know anything about a
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fight; that he knew nothing about a dispute between the
Butchers and Clerks; that he had not attended a union meetand that he had nothing to do with the butchers' union.
Tucker stated that he had come to San Diego with Cacio to
do some drinking and visit Tia Juana; that he had not come
with Dempster; that he had nothing to say about going to
Ferguson's Market; that he had attended a union meeting;
that he had heard about the jurisdictional dispute between
the Butchers and Clerks. He denied any connection with the
butchers' union; he denied that the butchers' union had hired
him to come to San Diego. Dimitratos told the officers he had
come to San Diego with Hazel for a vacation; that they were
staying at the Grant Hotel; that he had spent time with his
friend McFaden; that he had not, nor had his friends, been
involved in the fight at Ferguson's Market. Cacio denied
being employed by the butchers' union; or that he had any
interest in, or knowledge of, the dispute between the Butchers
and the Clerks. Hazel's answers to police questions were also
confusing and inconsistent. Meyer denied being at Ferguson's
Market on the day of the fight.
The People allege the following overt acts with respect to
the conspiracy to commit assault count:
(1) That Osslo had a conversation with Harry Lundeberg,
on or about October 13, 1955, in San Diego;
(2) That Dimitratos and Hazel met in San Diego on or
about October 15, 1955;
(3) 'fhat Mc:B'aden, at Osslo's request, made reservations
for three rooms at the U. S. Grant Hotel in San Diego on or
about October 14, 1955;
(4) That McFaden, Dimitratos and Hazel met at the U.S.
Grant Hotel on or about October 15, 1955;
(5) That Dimitratos and Hazel met at Butchers' Local 229,
227 E. Street, San Diego, on or about October 17, 1955;
( 6) That Dimitratos, Hazel and Meyer, and other representatives of butchers' local met at Tang's Market, 4508 Cass
Street, San Diego on or about October 18, 1955;
(7) That Dempster, Caeio and 'l'ucker met in San Diego,
on or about October 21, 1955;
(8) 'fhat Dempster, Cacio, Tucker, Dimitratos and Hazel
met at the Aee Motel, San Diego, on or about October 21, 1955;
(!J) Tl1at DPmpster, Caeio, 'l'ucker, Dimitratos and Hazel
aeeompanied .M.d<'aden and Meyer to Ferguson's Market in
Chula Vista on or about Oetober 22, 1955;
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(10) That DempRter, Cacio, Tucker, Dimitratofl and Hazel
were in a certain F'ord sedan leased by butchers' local in San
Diego on October 22nd ;
(11) That Osslo and/or McF'aden agreed to pay Dimitratos
his expenses and a weekly salary on or about October 15,
1955;
(12) (18) (14) (15) That there was a similar agreement
with Hazel, 'I'ucker, Dempster and Cacio.
The People argue that from the above alleged overt acts, a
jury could reasonably infer that a conspiracy to commit
assault existed between the defendants; that the jury could
reasonably determine that Osslo, with the knowledge and approval of McFaden and Meyer procured the services of the
five sailor defendants for the purpose of intimidating the
Clerks" by their appearance and that if this was not sufficient,
of perpetrating an assmtlt upon a clerk who shmdd happen
into their proximity."
There is evidence in the record which tends to prove all of
the alleged overt acts. As I read the record, however, there is
no evidence (and the People point to none) that the fight was
planned, or premeditated, or that any of the proved overt
acts lead to that conclusion. Assuming that Cacio provoked
the altercation and that Maurer did not (although the evidence is extremely close on that point) telephone calls between
the defendants, payment of expenses, salaries, and the making
of hotel reservations, do not lead to the conclusion that the
defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to commit an assault. The People argue, by quoting from the remarks made
by the trial court, that because the five defendants were
furnished bail, counsel, and their salaries were paid after the
assault, that the asRault had been planned between all defendants prior to its commission. In People v. Will1"ams, 80
Cal.App.2d 284 [85 P.2d 974], relied on by the People, there
was direct evidence that a conspiracy existed to commit assault. The same is also true of the case of People v. Dail, 22
Cal.2d 642 [140 P.2cl828], relied upon by the People. It is my
conclusion that the alleged and proved overt acts charged
against these defendants do not support the judgment convicting them of eonspiracy to commit assault.
MISCONDUCT Ol<' DrsTHICT ATTORNEY

It is the defendants' contention that the distril't attorney
engaged in a course of prejudieial misconduct during the
course of the ttoir dire examination of prospective jurors,
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the course of the trial, and during the arguments
jnry. Defendants cite numerous examples of misconamong whieh are the following:
On voir dire examiuation, prospective jurors ·were asked
whether they felt that ''any scgrmmt of our society should be
irnmune from the law" or "should take the law unto them'' and whether they felt that because a person '.Vas a
'' memlwr of a labor union, [he] deserves to get beat up once
awhile"; \vhether
the sustaining of an objection)
the prospedive juror felt that "might makes right"; whether
bceause the Clerl\s and Butehers had settled their difficulties
it would eause the prospective juror to adopt a "let's forget
it" attitude; ·whether the prospective juror felt that "the
eommunity might have some interest in the matter"; whether
the prospective juror had read "Vietor Riesel's column 'Inside l;abor' "; \Yhether any of the people in the jnry box had
read the eolumn; whether the prospeetive juror realized that
every time the district attorney introdu~cd a "bit of evidenee
in this case that in some way or other I am going to be prejudicing these defendant::; in your eyes''; that the juror realized
''don't you, that we arc not up here in a criminal department
to elect Mr. San Diego"; that "if in the course of this trial
and as you examine the faets surrounding the beating of the
elerk in Chula Vista, if you become aroused, and as a public
citizen as to what happened, will you try and remove that
from your mind and just try the case on the evidence and the
Court's instructions and use that to arrive at your eonclusion"; whether the prospective juror had heard that Mr.
Osslo was a member of the grand jury that indieted him. (An
objection was sustained to the last question.) It should be
here noted that defense counsel objected throughout the course
of the questioning that the questions were argumentative; that
the district attorne.v waR attempting to prejudiee the jury;
that the questions were irrelevant and immaterial; that the
questions were for the purpose of inflaming the minds of
tlie jurors.
During the opeuing statement, the district attoruey again
referred to the' fac:t that os~lo had been a member of the grand
jury that imlieted him and defense counsel's objcetion was
oyerruled. 'l'he distriet attorney then stated that the evidence
would ,;how that "in the middle of October, 1955, another
person was worried about Osslo and worried about goons.''
\Vhen defc'nse eounsel asked what the last word was, the
district attorney replied: ''Goons, Another man was worried
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about Osslo and about goons. G-o-o-n-s (spelling). That man
is Mr. Herb De Motte. He is a Secretary-Treasurer of a
Butchers Local in Wilmington.'' Defense counsel's objection
was overruled and the district attorney then made a long
and involved statement concerning the internal affairs of the
butchers' union and the difficulties between De Motte and
Osslo; that De Motte was afraid of ''goons. He was afraid to
hold meetings." The district attorney's statement was obviously an attempt to show that Osslo was a man to be feared
because he would set "goons" upon any person with whom he
disagreed. Defense counsel's objections were overruled and
the district attorney told the jury that De Motte would testify
as to his fear of ''goons.'' The defendants were constantly
referred to as ''goons.''
Prior to the taking of testimony, the trial court inadvertently started to instruct the jury concerning assault with
a deadly weapon. \Vhen defense counsel objected that no use
of a weapon had been charged and that the evidence would
show that no weapon had been employed, the district attorney
asked his co-counsel in the hearing of the jury: ''A prize
fighter is a weapon?'' Also assigned as misconduct is the fact
that before the court had ruled on the matter, and during a
conference in chambers concerning the admissibility thereof,
a board containing photographs of all the defendants, some
of which were taken on the day they were arrested, was so
carried and placed in the courtroom that it was visible to
the jury.
During the course of the trial, a witness was asked if he
knew that Harry Lundeberg supplied "strong arm men in
the labor movement." When an objection was sustained, the
district attorney again asked if the witness knew whether or
not on any prior occasion Lundeberg sent strong arm men
into jurisdictional disputes or disputes with management.
When a witness referred to Cacio as the ''second gentleman
there . . . " the district attorney said, "I object to the use
of the word 'gentleman.' " The district attorney also managed to get in evidence the general strike in Oakland in 1948,
or 1949, the Wall Street strike in 1948, the Western Union
strike in 1952, the United Financial Employees strike in
1948, in an attempt to show that Harry Lundeberg furnished
''strong-arm'' men from the Sailors of the Pacific to aid in
the strikes. To all of this evidence, defense counsel's objections were ovet-ruled. The distriet attorney in his questioning
referred to sending two sailors out to "bird dog Anderson"
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and to sending two sailors out ''to finger Anderson.'' When
Captain Roland, a police officer, testified that he "didn't like
a couple of big, husky men walking around as bodyguards and
[that they] gave the appearance of being toughs of the worst
sort. I didn't like it, but it wasn't their physical appearance,
other than they were big and husky,'' the district attorney
asked him ''As a matter of fact, if you hadn't seen them in
Osslo 's office you would have run them out of town~'' In
questioning the defendant Dimitratos, the district attorney
asked: ''As a matter of fact, any time Lunde berg gets in any
type of dispute that he is out for a jurisdictional grab it is
the old Communist slogan he uses. . . . ''
During closing argument to the jury, the district attorney
stated "Incidentally, let me say this: a man died in the gas
chamber not too long ago for just this type of conduct. He
beat a woman in the face and when she fell he kicked and
killed her and he died for that.'' He also stated: '' Incidentally, while mentioning him, let me say this: one or more
of the jurors may say, 'Well, that Jackson was in this thing
and he was at the scene and he did as much as some of the
other people. Why isn't Jackson indicted? Why isn't Lundeberg indicted f' Those are unindicted coconspirators. That
shouldn't concern you here. In other words. . . . '' After
objection, the court stated that the district attorney's "remarks weren't directly in conformity with the Indictment.
The indictment does not name them as unindicted co-conspirators, but if he feels under the evidence they are coconspirators he may so state.'' After other objections, the
court again stated that if the district attorney felt that "some
of his witnesses were co-conspirators he may so tell the jury,
if he bases it on the evidence.'' The district attorney also
told the jury "You hear about the great man, Harry Lundeberg, that is clearing the waterfront of Communists. Let me
say this : Harry Lundeberg, Barney Mayes and Harry Bridges
were all bed fellows at one time . . . . " After being told by
the court to proceed with his argument, the district attorney
said : ''The water tenders, the firemen and what have you is
an independent union and Lundeberg, in his grab for power,
has used that old slogan to grab these unions, so that is
malarky when they try to inject Communism in this case.
It has been something Lundeberg used to control the docks.
It is two percent his fight against Communism and ninety
eight per cent his grab for jurisdictional power. That is what
it amounts to. So don't let them get you off base on this
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big man who, as I said, was a brei fellow of Harry Bridges
back in the thirties. Bridges sponsored him to he head of
the Maritime Federation of the Paeific." After the court
told the district attorney to confine himself to the evidence,
he said: ''So that fellow Lunde berg, don't get auy misconception about him. 'l'hat fellow Lundeberg, where were the
Communists on \Vall Street when they had five hundred
men-'' 'fhe Court: Mr. 0 'Laughlin, I kept that out of evidence.
"Mr. O'Laughlin: \Vell, where were the Communists in
the Western Union strike? \Vhen old Thompson got beat up
because he happened to cross a picket line? None of that at
all. Lundeberg-and the reason vYe were bringing it in,
counsel says what has \Vall Street to do with it and the
general strike in Oakland, or what has the \Vestern Union
strike to do with it. It shows a pattern that IJ1mdeberg supplies the noise and the muscle. He can swing a jurisdictional
dispute; he can swing an election. You and I might be members of a union and be sore at the particular administration
and we might want it out for one reason or another, but if
the pack that is in brings down the muscle, brings down
some of Lundeberg's boys, we are going to be silenced because
we are going to be afraid of our lives, afraid to open our
mouths, bec-ause if we do ~we might get the treatment JYiaurer
and Thompson got.'' vYhen this was objected to by defense
counsel as unsupported by the evidenee and as improper and
inflammatory, the court merely told the district attorney to
''Proceed.''
While numerous additional instances of the same type of
conduct could be cited, it appears that the above is sufficient
to show that the district attorney was guilty of prejudicial
misconduct insofar as all of these defendants are concerned.
As we said in People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d G42, G50 [140 P.2d
828], "It is also true, however, that in a elose case where
the evidence is sharply conflicting, substantial and serious
errors vital to defendant that may have resulted in a miscarriage of justice must be regarded as prejudicial and
grounds for reversal. (People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 723
[108 P.2d 4].)" In the case at bar, the district attorney
managed to interject much immaterial and irrelevant matter
concerning strikes, the use of pickets, and assaults in other
strikes which could not have had any other effect than to
prejudice these defendants who were not claimed to have taken
part therein. :Further, the numerous references to the defend-
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ants as "goons," "strongarm" men, "muscle" men, and the
objections to the term "gentleman" as applied to one of the
defendants were highly inflammatory and prejudicial, as were
the district attorney's references to Lunde berg as a former
Communist. From the district attorney's comments, arguments and questions, it apprars that the entire labor movement was on trial and that anyone connected therewith was
suspect as a participant in the trial of this particular case.
Such conduct is reprehensible and should not be condoned.
In People v. Lyons, 47 CaL2d 311, 318 [303 P.2d 329], we
said, quoting from Vier-eck v. United Slates, 318 U.S. 236,
248 [63 S.Ct. 561, 87 L.Ed. 734]:" 'The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, bnt that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.' '' Here, as
in People v. Teixeir-a, 136 CaLApp.2d 136 [288 P.2d 535],
''. . . it is hard to believe that this experienced prosecutor
asked them [questions] in good faith and for any purpose
other than to degrade defendants." In People v. Vienne, 142
Cal.App.2d 172 [297 P.2d 1027], it was held that the district
attorney is bound to refrain from making inflammatory statements (see also People v. Wakes, 44 Cal.2d 679 [284 P.2d
) ; in People v. Henderson, 144 Cal.App.2d 706 [301 P.2d
468] (where the same district attorney was involved), it was
held prejudicial and reversible error for the prosecutor to
state or imply the existence of facts concerning which no
evidence had been introduced.
ADMISSioN· AND ExcLUSION OF EviDENCE

It is first claimed by the defendants that the court erred
in' admittiug the testimony of Captain Hodson. 'fhis testimony ineluded the admission in evidenee of part of the log
book of the steamship l.Juckenbaeh concerning a fight in 1952
in whieh defendants Dimitratos and Dempster were involved.
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Defendants contend, and their counsel argued at the time
the evidence was admitted that the evidence was immaterial,
irrelevant, too remote from the San Diego incident, and that
it was prejudicial error for the prosecution in the first instance
to put in evidence the bad character of the defendants. The
trial court also permitted the People to put in evidence
testimony that defendant Dimitratm; had been stabbed in a
fight on board ship in 1.951; and that Dempster and Hazel
were in the same crew. In People v. Teixeira, 136 Cal.App.
2d 136, 148 [288 P.2d 535], People v. Adams, 76 Cal.App. 178
[244 P. 106], People v. Nunley, 142 Cal. 441 [76 P. 45], it was
held that such evidenee was inadmissible as an attack on the
character of the defendant by the prosecution and constituted
prejudicial error. In People v. Lyons, 47 Cal.2d 311, 317 [303
P.2d 329], where the prosecution alluded on the cross-examination of the defendant's wife to a prior conviction of defendant, we said: "It would be an impeaehment of the legal learning of counsel for the People to intimate that he did not know
the aforesaid questions to be improzJet·, wholly unjustifiable
and peculiarly calculated to prejudice the appellant before
the jury." (Emphasis added.) (See also People v. Hardy,
33 Cal.2d 52, 61 [198 P.2d 865] ; People v. McKelvey, 85 Cal.
App. 769, 771 [260 P. 397].)
The above evidence was held admissible by the trial court
on the theory that a conspiracy had been charged even though
the People did not contend that the conspiracy had dated
back to 1951 and 1952. Defense counsel's motion to strike
was denied by the trial court. From the trial court's remarks,
it is obvious that the evidence was held admissible on the
theory that a conspiracy presently existed between all defendants.
The evidence was inadmissible on any theory and its prejudicial effect is at once apparent.
The admission of evidence concerning the Wall Street
strike, the general strike in Oakland and the \Vestern Union
strike has heretofore been commented upon in the discussion
concerning the prejudicial misconduct of the district attorney.
The trial court's statement that ''The reason I let this testimony in was to show other instances where the members of the
Sailors Union were used and what transpired, to show the
demeanor of the sailors used on the picket lines. In this
conspiracy count you are entitled to know all the surrounding
circumstances of the people that were employed in the ineident down here, if one happened,'' and the court's later ad-
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mission that there was an entirely different group of sailors
in San Diego, clearly show the error that was committed.
The case at bar involved an assault and a conspiracy to commit
an assault and the fact that other sailors were used in picket
lines in other areas remote in place and time is completely
immaterial and irrelevant and was highly prejudicial to the
defendants in the case at bar. (People v. Lyons, 47 Cal.2d 311
[303 P.2d 329] ; People v. Hardy, 33 Cal.2d 52, 61-62 [198
P.2d 865]; People v. Wynn, 44 Cal.A.pp.2d 723, 732-733 [112
P.2d 979] ; People v. Freitas, 34 Cal.App.2d 684, 687 (94 P.2d
397]; People v. Stafford, 108 Cal.App. 26, 29-31 [290 P. 920] .)
Defendants contend that the court erred in excluding testimony offered by them to show that threats had been made
against some of them which :necessitated the request to Lundeberg for bodyguards to accompany the Butchers' business
agents on their rounds. Inasmuch as the evidence is in sharp
conflict as to which side started the :fight, this testimony
should have been admitted. If threats had been shown to have
been made against the business agents of the Butchers by
members of the clerks' union, the evidence would be admissible
as tending to prove the defense theory that the five defendants
were summoned to San Diego to act as bodyguards only and
to disprove the People's theory that a conspiracy to commit
assault existed between all eight of the defendants.
PUNISHMENT OF 0SSLO, :McFADEN AND MEYER AS IMPROPER,
ExcESSIVE AND UNLAWFUL

Osslo and McFaden were each :fined $1,500 to be paid from
their own funds; Meyer was :fined $750 to be paid from his
own funds.
Osslo and McFaden were ordered to serve six months in the
county jail; Meyer was ordered to serve three months in the
connty jail.
These three defendants were placed on 10 years' probation,
during which time they could hold no union office and receive
no salary for any union services, or participate in any union
negotiations. In addition, these defendants were required to
fill out an annual affidavit that the :fine payments were made
from their own funds and that they held no union office, etc.,
and "further, that this Court and Judge shall retain jurisdiction of this matter throughout the said period of probation
and no other department of the Court or other Judge shall
modify this order without notice to the Judge who tried the
case. ... "
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Defendants argue that the terms of their probation eut off
their ability to earn a livelihood ; that said terms violate
the principle back of probation which "is defined as an act of
grace and clemency, which may be granted by the court to a
seemingly deserving defendant, whereby he may escape the
extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of
whieh he stands convicted." (People v. Hainline, 219 Cal.
532, 534 [28 P.2d 16] ; Lee v. Superior Coz~rt, 89 Cal.App.2d
716, 717 [201 P .2d 882]) and that it violates the principle that
the terms and conditions of probation must be reasonable
under all the circumstances (In re Trombley, 31 Cal.2d 801,
811 [193 P.2d 734] ).
\Vhile these three defendants were found guilty of both
conspiracy to eommit assault, and assault with force likely
to produce great bodily harm, it is apparent from the record
that they were not involved in the actual assault. Defendants
claim, with merit, that it is impossible to determine whether
they were convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor since they
were charged with and found guilty of conspiracy to commit
assault and charged with, and found gnilty of, assault with
force likely to produce great bodily injnry.
Defendants' arguments in this respect have merit. It appears that the terms of probation are such as would deprive
defendants of their means of livelihood and also violate the
principles of probation. The purpose of probation is not to
impose penalties (In re Ilays, 120 Cal.App.2d 308, 310 [260
P.2d 1030] ; In re Martin, 82 Cal.App.2d 16, 22 [185 P.2d
645]). It is my opinion that the trial court was guilty
of an abuse of discretion with respect to the terms and conditions of probation imposed on defendants Osslo, McFaden
and Meyer.
ERRORS IN THE MAJORITY OPINION
THE EVIDENCE :

I have heretofore set forth a fair statement of the evidence
as it relates to the case at bar. We are here concerned with
evidence to support a judgment of conviction of conspiracy to
commit assault. There is no doubt that an assault was committed by some of the defendants. Defendants Osslo, McFaden and Meyer were not involved in the actual assault and
the People do not so argue. The majority opinion quotes
at length from the testimony of one Jackson, a business agent
for the Butchers. Nothing said by the witness, or quoted in
the majority opinion, leads to the conclusion that these defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to commit assault. The
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majority makes much of the statements of the witness that
the police force was not called for protection rather than
members of the sailors' union, that older, unemployed members of the butchers' union of San Diego were not called
upon to act as observers and that members of other San Diego
labor unions were not called upon. The witness' testimony
regarding his belief that members of the Butchers had reason
to fear violence from the Clerks is quoted extensively in an
endeavor by the majority to show that no such fear could
reasonably have existed. In the first instance there is no
law that I am aware of which would require these defendants
to ask police protection or to hire any particular segment of
society to act as their observers. I also know of no law
prohibiting the hiring of a bodyguard for protection. It also
appears to me highly unlikely that any police force would
have sufficient men available to accompany members of labor
unions on their rounds in order to prevent trouble which at
that time was only a possibility. Insofar as the fear of trouble
was concerned and any threats, by conduct, or otherwise, made
by members of the Clerks to members of the Butchers were
concerned it appears to me that fear is subjective and that
these men, who were there at the time, were far more able
to recognize it than the members of the majority of this court
who only know what appears in the record as we see it tod~;ty.
Because defendant Osslo said he was "top man" on the
west coast and ''that was it'' and because he said the Butchers
would ''show'' the Clerks, the majority infers that Osslo ''set
up a situation which inferentially was designed to, and which
clearly did, increase the likelihood of violence iu the jurisdictional dispute. On a view of the evidence favorable to the
prosecution, which the law at this stage of the proceeding
requires of us, it is fairly inferrible that Osslo, McFaden, and
1\feyer at least tacitly understood, anticipated that the remainfive defendants wonld not merely be present to act as
'observers' and protect the Butchers from violence, bnt would
and should initiate the violence, which they subsequently did
initiate, to 'show' the Clerks that Osslo indeed 'was boss of
the West Coast and he would fight for jurisdiction' and 'that
was it.' " No such inferences ean be fairly drawn from tlte
recor·d. It should be borne in mind that the conspiracy
charged here was to commit assault-not a conspiracy to make
Osslo "boss" of the west coast! There is absolutely nothing
in the record from which an inference may be drawn that
Osslo intended the five defendants to "initiate" violence and
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in the state of this reeord with its numerous instances of
prejudicial misconduct and the close question of fact presented concerning just which labor union instigated the altercation, this eourt should not concern itself with drawing such
an inference. Because other members of the sailors' union
had partieipated in other labor union disputes in other parts
of the eountry in 1948, 1949 and 1952, and had, according to
the rna.iority, been guilty of assault and battery in conneetion
therewith, we are told that we may infer that Osslo, McFaden
and Meyer knew that thE'se defendants would initiate violence.
So far as this record is coneerned we do not know whether
or not the members of the sailors' union engaged in those
other strikes were the guilty ones in the crime of assault and
battery. Por all we know, the other parties involwd may have
been the guilty ones and the sailors' members eompletely
innocent. Even if the members of the Railors' union involved
in those other strikes were the guilty ones, Rhould every member of a labor union to which he must belong if he is to earn
his livelihood be held guilty of the same crime 1 'fhe question
answers itself and shows the fallacy in the reasoning of the
majority. That reasoning carries the philosophy of ''guilt
by association" to its ultimate extreme.
ADMISSION AND REJECTION OF EviDENCE:

The majority feels that the admission of evidence concerning other and remote labor disputes in which other members
of the sailors' union were involved was not prej ndicial error
when eonRidered in the "light of other circumstances, including the prior activities of Osslo, MeFaden and Meyer" to
show that these men "contemplated that the employment of
the sailor defendants probably would result in acts of violence by" the other five defendants. First we are told to
rely on the asserted violent tendencies of other members of
the sailors' union to show that Osslo, MeFaden and Meyer
are guilty as charged and, secondly, that "the prior [ unexplained] activities" of the three men made such evidence
admissible because it showed their knowledge that violence
would result. There is absolutely nothing in the record to
show any connection between the other strikes in which other
members of the sailors' union participated and any of these
defendants except that some of them belonged to the sailors'
un10n.
The majority finds that the jury could not have been misled
because of the admission of evidence of fights, uneonneoted
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with labor
whieh tweurred in 1951 and 1952, and
whieh oceurrerl on board ships on which Dimitratos and
Dempster were sailors. It is said that "in light of the circumstances :surrounding their importation and employment,
it does not appt>ar that the jury could have been misled by
evidence that they had been involved in other altercations."
'l'he only reason for the admission of such evidence would be
to show the allegedly bad character of these two defendants
and was wholly inadmissible as I have heretofore pointed out
and such evidence has, up until this case, been held to constitute an unwarranted attack on the character of a defendant
and to constitute prejudicial error. The question is not one
of misleading the jnry but goes to the question of due process
in that every person aecused of a erime is entitled to a fair
trial on the merits of his particular ease.
Coneerning the admission of evidenee of telephone calls
between the defendants and other members of their organizations of whieh the defendants eomplain, the majority says
'"rhis evidence was properly reeeived to show defendants'
association; that that association was criminal is shown by
the other e.-vidence, viewed as a whole." This statement assumes the answer to the main question involved-whether
defendants conspi1·ed to eommit the assault and battery which
oecurred. lVIere association and telephone calls, the subject
matter of whieh is completely unknown, have never, until now
been sufficient to show that a conspiraey to commit a crime
existed. Under the holding here, no assoeiation, no telephone
eall, ean be innocent and immune from a later charge of
eonspiracy if one of the parties should later be aeeused of a
crime of any type.
With respeet to the admission of evidence of the arrest of
two members of the elerks' union after the assault and battery
involved here oceurred, and of which defendants eomplain,
the majority says that ''This testimony tends to show that
defendant Osslo, after the assault, attempted to harass the
Ulerks by unsubstantiated aecusations and to distract emphasis from the charges against him by countereharges; it
was thus admissible as tending to show that Osslo was a
conspirator carrying on an effort to make good his declaration
that he 'was boss of the West Coast and he would fight for
jurisdiction,' and not, as he argues, the innoeent employer of
persons who were to aetas 'observers' or at the most to show
the Clerks that the Butchers were proteeted, without the
exercise of force.'' The conspiracy charged here was that

124

[50 C.2d

of assault and battery, not the promotion of (};;slo as "boss"
of the west coast. 'rhe assault and battery had occurred
before the arrrst of the clerks and heneP the eonspiracy, if
any, had been tPrminated. To be admissible, the aet or declaration must have been made during the pendency and prior
to the termination of the enterprise and in f1trtherance of
the common design (People v. Brown, 59 Cal. 345; Estate of
Strachan, 166 Cal. 162 [135 P. 296] ; B1t.cld v. Morgan, 187
Cal. 741 [203 P. 7fi4J ; People v. Perlin, 203 Cal. 587 [265
P. 230]; People v. Smith, 151 Cal. 619 [91 P. 511]; People v.
Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731 [104 P.2d 794]; People v. Steccone,
36 Cal.2d 234 [223 P.2d 17 J).
'l'he majority holds that the exclusion of evidence concerning lVIcFaden 's report to Jackson and Osslo that he had been
frightened by the Clerks could not, in the "light of the
record'' have prejudiced defendants. 'rhis evidence was
patently admissible under the defendants' theory and should
have been admitted. It is clearly seen that evidence damning
to them is held properly admitted while evidence in their
favor is held properly excluded. A fair trial encompasses
all the relevant and material admissible evidence whether
favorable, or unfavorable, to either side. A fair trial does
not mean a trial where the prosecution uses every means,
whether fair, or foul, to gain a conviction and no court should
condone such a practice. As we said in People v. Lyons, 47
Cal.2d 311, 317 [303 P.2d 329], it would be an impeachment
of the legal le.arning of counsel for the People to intimate
that he did not know that what he was doing was improper,
wholly unjustifiable and peculiarly calculated to prejudice the
appellant before the jury. Counsel for the People knew, or
should have known, that his conduct and a great deal of the
evidence produced by him was wholly irrelevant and that it
was "peculiarly calculated to prejudice" the defendants in
the eyes of the jury. He should also have known that evidence
relevant to defendants' side of the case was admissible and a
part of the entire background of the American system of
jurisprudence -a fair trial.
MISCONDUCT OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY:

I have heretofore set forth in detail some of the instances
in which the district attorney was guilty of prejudicial misconduct ~wd the majority has cited some additional examples all of which were calculated to and did inflame the minds
of the jurors. 'I' he majority, however, finds that "the evi-
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deuce so overwhelmingly supports the implied findings that
it docs not appear reasonable to believe that the misconduct
was a contributing factor" in arriving at the verdicts. As I
have pointed out at length the evidence is far from overwhelming-it is nonexistent so far as a conspiracy is involved
since the overt acts, in and of themselves, while proved,
do not lead to the inevitable conclusion that defendants conspired to commit assault and battery. The overt acts charged
~onsisted of a number of conversations and meetings between
the defendants, a labor meeting at ·which defendants were
present, hotel reservations made for some of the defendants;
defendants' presence in can; leased by the butchers' local of
San Diego; salaries agreed to be paid to the five defendants
by Osslo or McF'aden. 'fhere was no proof, either direct or
circumstantial, of what the conversations were at either the
meetings or at the labor meeting; there 1vas no proof either
direct or circmnstantial that at any of the times charged,
defendants conspired to commit assault and battery. The
majority, however, infers that all of these meetings were used
for an evil and unlawful purpose and concludes that the
rvidenee against all the defendants is so "overwhelming" that
no misconduct could have prejudiced the defendants in the
eyes of the jury.
It can hardly be doubted that the interjection of Communism in the ease 1vas prejudicial to the defendants as was
the use of the words ''goon,'' ''finger man,'' ''strong-arm
men," and "toughs." All of these things tended to attack
the character of the defendants so as to prejudiec them in
the minds of the jurors and from the state of the record were
obviously calculated to do just that by the prosecutor.
An admonition to the jury to decide the case on the evidence
produced is insuffieient to eure the errors and misconduct
which occurred in this case. A reading of the record shows
that from the voiT dire examination of prospective jurors,
throughout the trial, and until its close, the prosecution was
guilty of a deliberate attempt to harass, embarrass, and prejudice these defendants. The majority finds nothing wrong
with the trial judge permitting counsel for the People to
"yeH" at one of the defendants while on the stand. It is
said that the reeord does not show that the "yelling" intimidated the witness. 'l'he district attorney is a representative
of the People and as such is not "at liberty to strike foul"
blows. Here, as in People v. Teixeira, 136 Cal.App.2d 136
[288 P.2d 535], "
it is hard to believe that this expe-
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rienced prosecutor'' yelled at a witness ''in good faith and for
any purpose other than to degrade'' him.
CoNDITIONS OF PROBATION :

I have heretofore discussed these conditions and my reasons
for feeling that they were excessive and in violation of the
principle of probation. The majority cites People v. Frank,
94 Cal.App.2d 740, 741-742 [211 P.2d 350], as authority for
its holding that the punishment imposed was perfectly proper.
In the Frank case the defendant was himself guilty of committing a crime. In the ease at bar, defendants Osslo, MeFadeD and Meyer were not guilty of the aetual assault and
it is only by means of the improper use of the conspiracy
statute that they are in any way involved. As I have pointed
out the record shows a total lack of evidence that these
defendants conspired with the others to commit the crime with
which they were eharged and a majority of this court, in
affirming the judgments of conviction and the terms of probation, has deprived these three defendants of their means
of earning a livelihood since they may not even work as
the most menial of laborers in their own nnion and cannot
receive remuneration ''from any union.'' The terms of
probation are wholly out of line with the cases holding that
probation is an aet of graee and elemeney for the purpose of
permitting rehabilitation of a drfendant who is "seemingly
deserving" and for the purpose of permitting him to "eseape
the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the
offense of which he stands eonvieted" (People v. Hainline,
219 Cal. 532, 534 [28 P.2d 16] ; Lee v. Superior Court, 89 Cal.
App.2d 716, 717 [201 P.2d 882]).
SuMMATION

In my opinion :
1. 'fhe judgment should be reversed with direetions to dismiss the charge of eonspiraey to eommit assault as to all
defendants beeause of the total lack of evidence in the record
to support the charge.
2. The rceord shows that only the defendants, Cacio, Ttwker
and possibly Dempsf er and Dirnitrat os, could have engaged
in the assault. There is no evidence to show that it was other
than a spontaneous assault and, in view of the sharp conflict
in the evidenee as to the person responsible for starting the
altercation and the prejndieial miscondmt of the district
attorney, as vVPll as the highly prejudieial ehararter of the
evidence erroneously admitted (as heretofore discussed), the
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should be reversed as to tlJpm in order that they
have a fair tr·ial on the merits.
vVe held in People v.
47 Cal.2d 811, 319 [303 P.2d 329], that "It is axiomatic
that when an accused is denied that fair and impartial trial
guaranteed by law, such procedure amounts to a denial of
due process of law (Powell v. Alabama [1932], 287 U.S. 45
S.Ct. 55, 77 I.1.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527])."
3. Since there is no evidence which tends to connect defendants Osslo, 1\IcFaden, Meyer and Hazel with the actual
assault, the trial court should be directed to dismiss as to these
defendants the charge of assault by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury.
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 23,
1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and rrraynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

[ Crim. No. 6108.

In Bank.

.M:ar. 27, 1958.]

'!'.HE PEOPI1E, Respondent, v. ELMER TAHTINEN,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Right to Speedy Trial-Waiver.-'l'he constitutional right to a speedy trial ( Const., art. I, § 13) and the
statutory requirements that criminal cases be set for trial for
a date not later than 30 days after the entry of defendant's
plea, that criminal cases be given precedence over civil matters
and proceedings (Pen. Code, § 1050), and that the court, unless
good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the action dismissed where defendant, whose trial has not been postponed
on his application, is not brought to trial within 60 days after
the filing of the information (Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. 2),
may be waived.
[2] Id.-Appeal-Presumptions-Continuance.-Where the record
does not disclose on whose application the continuances for
See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 128.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Criminal Law,§ 246; [2] Criminal
Law,§ 1288; [4, 5, 9, 10] Criminal Law,§ 243; [6] Criminal Law,
248; [7] Criminal IJaw, § 244; [8] Criminal Law, § 241; [11]
Arrest, § 12; [12] Criminal Law, § 188; [13] Poisons, § 12; [14]
Poisons, § 15; [15] Criminal Law, § 107.

